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ABSTRACT 
 The Mission Dependency Index (MDI) is a metric used by all U.S. military 
services for guiding operations, management, and funding decisions for facilities at 
military installations. Despite its broad adoption, several studies on MDI suggest it may 
have flaws that limit its efficacy. We present the first rigorous technical analysis of MDI 
as to how its flaws impact decisions and determine ways to overcome them. We develop 
a formal mathematical definition of MDI based on multilayer networks that supports 
reproducible models and formal analysis of the MDI calculation process used in the U.S. 
Navy. Based on our multilayer formalism, we define three technical problems with MDI 
methods not previously discussed in the literature. We develop a new model for 
calculating MDI based on network flow analysis that overcomes these problems. We 
demonstrate our new approach by assessing the vulnerability of a realistic diesel fuel 
marine mission to facility disruptions. Overall, our work provides clarity on how to 
interpret and avoid pitfalls in MDI calculation and use. 
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Executive Summary
The Mission Dependency Index (MDI) is a metric used by U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD) military services and U.S. federal agencies to prioritize operations, management, 
construction, and funding of facilities and infrastructure assets. MDI was originally devel-
oped by Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center to evaluate the relative importance 
of facilities to missions within and across military installations based on the principles 
of U.S. Navy (USN) Operational Risk Management (ORM). It focuses attention on how 
installation missions may be negatively impacted if a facility is rendered inoperable. MDI 
is calculated using factors for the interuptability, relocateability, and replaceability (IRR) 
of facility functions, where IRR is measured via expert elicitation of installation mission 
owners answering four ordinal survey questions. Survey responses are transformed into an 
MDI score normalized from 0 to 100 for each facility using equations defined in USN in-
structions. The greater the consequence of the facility’s loss, the higher perceived criticality 
of the facility to mission, the higher the MDI score. MDI scores are then converted into 
prioritization categories that guide DoD and federal government spending. MDI was used 
to justify nearly $20 B of Fiscal Year 21 federal funds.
Despite its broad adoption across federal agencies, the efficacy of MDI for facility prioritization 
is disputed. Previous studies identify general issues with how MDI scores are calculated and 
used, such as how MDI does not address risk by standard USN ORM procedures. Still, no 
previous work develops a rigorous technical analysis of how MDI is calculated and applied to 
show how flaws may lead to sub-optimal decisions. This is partly due t o the dubious nature of 
MDI. Contrary to doctrine and USN instructions, the MDI calculation process is complicated 
with many nuances, lacks formal definitions of key terms, and leaves installation users to make 
assumptions about how to interpret final results. Altogether, MDI is widely regarded as a useful, 
but flawed, tool and there is no study showing what those flaws are or what they mean for the 
federal government.
The purpose of this work is to develop a rigorous mathematical analysis of MDI that 
reveals flaws in its implementation and use. The overall goal is to develop new methods to 
assess facility importance that overcome these flaws. Towards this goal, we develop:
xv
• a formal mathematical definition of MDI based on multilayer networks that provides
rigorous technical methods for facilities at military installations;
• an analysis of MDI showing its technical flaws, including flaws in its interpretation
and calculation;
• a series of simple, real-world examples showing the implications of these flaws for
installation decision-making;
• a new model for how facilities relate to missions via flow network models;
• an analysis of this new model and conclusions on how it improves upon current
methods for MDI; and,
• recommendations and next steps for improving MDI within the USN.
Our work relies on established methods for multilayer networks and network flow optimiza-
tion. We dissect the key elements of the MDI process and create an installation multilayer
network formalism that supports MDI calculation for facilities. Our multilayer network
methods are the first rigorous explanation for how MDI works and enables formal analysis
of the MDI survey and calculation process.
Building upon our formalism, we present a novel critique of MDI not found previously in
the literature. First, we identify issues with MDI interpretation and use for decision-making.
These issues stem from conflating long-term infrastructure funding decisions with measures
for near-term consequences of facility disruption. Misinterpretation of MDI leads to some
mission essential facilities (e.g., a water pumping station) receiving lower scores than less
critical facilities (e.g., a gymnasium).We provide guidance on how to overcome these issues
by clarifying the purpose of MDI scores and categories for survey respondents.
However, we also find three inherent issues with MDI calculation that cannot be overcome
with more clarity in instructions. We name these flaws the mission partitioning problem,
the interdependency assignment problem, and the replaceability problem. Each of these
problems has the potential to raise or lower the MDI score of a facility based on seemingly
arbitrary decisions for an installation, such as choosing the number of facilities assigned
to each mission, the number of missions on the installation, and the sharing of functions
across facilities. We determine that MDI as currently defined in USN instructions cannot
overcome these issues.
Instead, we develop a new model for MDI based on network flow optimization. Our new
xvi
methods overcome these problems by being insensitive to mission partitioning, supporting
more explicit interdependency assignment, and supporting dynamic analysis of functional
relocateability and replaceability.Wedemonstrate our newmodel for a characteristicmission
for distributing diesel fuel marine across an installation. Results show that network flow
models do overcome identified flaws in MDI. Moreover, they reveal new issues with MDI
that need to be addressed associated with the sourcing and distribution of services like fuel.
Overall, this work helps identify and overcome flaws in a key metric used by all DoD
services for installation mission readiness. Results provide clarity on how to interpret MDI
and avoid pitfalls in its calculation and use. Still, the work presented here is limited. Future
work can build on this assessment to relate our initial model for a single mission to multiple
missions at an installation. Moreover, our analysis is based on simulated responses to MDI
surveys and would benefit from real-world case studies based on survey responses from
USN subject matter experts.
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The Department of Defense (DoD) is split into two chains of command that share a common
goal through separate lines of effort. The first is the Operational Command which plans and
executes operational and tactical functions. The second is the Administrative Command that
oversees and budgets for Personnel, Equipment, Supply, Training, Ordnance, Networks, and
Infrastructure (PESTONI). The PESTONI pillars are defined by the DoD Chief Financial
Officer, Comptroller (2018) as managing the following functions and needs:
1. Personnel: compensation, medical, and administration;
2. Equipment: sustainment, maintenance, and modernization;
3. Supply: material readiness; spares, repair parts, and consumables;
4. Training: ensuring forces remain proficient and effective;
5. Ordnance: capacity to load and reload naval forces;
6. Networks: cyber security, Command and Control (C2), information, and the systems
and networks used to support; and,
7. Infrastructure: systems of facilities, buildings, structures, equipment, or installations
required for military purposes.
This thesis focuses on analyzing the efficacy of DoD practices for managing critical in-
frastructure at military installations. Critical infrastructure is defined by the DoD as, “The
infrastructure and assets vital to a nation’s security, governance, public health and safety,
economy, and public confidence” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2020). Critical infrastructure en-
sures the adequate flow of electricity, fuel, water, communications, supplies, food, and other
resources required to complete military missions. The infrastructure pillar is broad and in-
cludes diverse activities and decision-makers at installations, including engineering and
public works, communication and information technology, physical assets (e.g., runways,
ports), and other specialty services.
U.S. military services use two key performancemeasures to prioritize infrastructure funding
and operational needs at installations: the Facility Condition Index (FCI) and Mission
Dependency Index (MDI). FCI is a measure used to determine the current condition of
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DoD facilities and guides military construction, rehabilitation, and demolition activities
(Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment 2021). MDI is a measure that
relates facilities to military missions to help prioritize operations and management efforts
for facilities at the installation level.
This thesis focuses on the calculation and implications ofMDI for facility funding decisions.
For the remainder of this thesis, we refer to assets and systems assessed by MDI as facilities
to broadly capture the critical infrastructure associated with the PESTONI pillars. For more
information on FCI and how facility condition impacts decisions, see Renosto (2019).
1.1 The Mission Dependency Index
The calculation and use of MDI influences operations and protection of facilities at military
installations. MDI was developed by Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC)
to evaluate the relative importance of facilities to each other based on the principles of U.S.
Navy (USN) Operational Risk Management (ORM) (Antelman and Miller 2002).
The most common use of MDI is to prioritize operations, management, construction, and
funding decisions at an installation alongside FCI. Prior to MDI, facility prioritization
was determined qualitatively by the installation Commanding Officer. MDI was adopted to
provide a quantitative way that identifies critical facilities and prioritizes their funding. MDI
is calculated by converting expert elicitation of mission needs into a normalized score on a
scale of 0 to 100 for each facility on an installation. It focuses attention on how installation
missions may be negatively impacted if a facility is rendered inoperable. The greater the
consequence of the facility’s loss, the higher perceived criticality of the facility, and the
higher the MDI score.
Notably, MDI is not used for ranking supporting systems such as the roads, power lines, and
water distribution pipelines that connect facilities. Instead, the MDI framework implicitly
assumes these additional critical infrastructure systems will operate to supply services to
high MDI facilities for mission assurance.
Assigning an MDI score for a facility consists of a two-step process involving a survey of
installation mission-owners and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and then calculating MDI
for each facility based on survey results.
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1.1.1 Step 1: MDI Facility Survey
At the heart of MDI is a survey conducted to relate relate facility functions to mission.
The survey involves four questions with ordinal responses where the “leader(s) directly
responsible for the mission or operation [of the facility] are asked to respond” (Antelman
and Miller 2002). The questions in the survey are meant to evaluate the importance fa-
cility functions to mission using three factors known as Interuptability, Relocateability,
and Replaceability (IRR), defined in Commander, Navy Installations Command (2018) as
follows:
• Interruptability is the length of time a mission can sustain given an interruption of
facility functions or the length of time before an interruption in functions affects
mission operations;
• Relocatability is the difficulty and time required to relocate a facility function required
by a mission to another facility; and
• Replaceability is the difficulty and time required to replace a facility function required
by a mission with another equivalent function.
The first two survey questions assess interruptability and relocatability of a facility, and
the answers are used to assess its intradependency score. Intradependency is intended to
measure the relationship of a facility to the mission and mission-owners that own and
operate it. The following intradependency questions and responses are reproduced verbatim
from Commander, Navy Installations Command (2018):
Question 1 (Intradependency / Interruptability): How long could the functions
supported by your infrastructure be stopped without adverse impact to the mission?
N: None (Must be maintained continuously (24/7) (Note: If you select “N”
additional information must be provided to support that the mission cannot
be interrupted).
B: Brief (minutes or hours not to exceed 24 hours).
S: Short (days not to exceed 7 days or hours).
P: Prolonged (more than a week).
Question 2 (Intradependency / Relocatability): If your facility were not func-
tional, could you continue performing your mission by using another facility, or by
setting up temporary facilities?
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I: Impossible (an alternate location is not available)
X: Extremely Difficult (an alternate location exists with minimally acceptable ca-
pabilities, but would require either a significant in-house effort (money/man-
hours), dislocation of another major occupant or contracting for additional
services and no available contract mechanism is in place to replace the services
being provided.
D: Difficult (an alternate location exists with acceptable capabilities and capac-
ity, but relocation would require a measurable and unbudgeted level of effort
(money/man-hours), but mission readiness capabilities would not be compro-
mised in the process.
P: Possible (an alternate location is readily available with sufficient capabilities
and capacity; in addition, the level of effort has been budgeted for or can be
easily absorbed)
Upon completion of Question 1 and 2, an intradependency score is calculated using the
matrix shown in Figure 1.1. The intradependency score is denoted by MD|, meaning
“Mission Dependency Within,” referring to the importance of facility functions within a
mission.
Figure 1.1. Calculation of Mission Intradependency Score. Expert elicitation
is used to determine how mission needs supported by a facility are affected
by facility interruption and relocatability. Experts responses to Questions 1
and 2 are then input into this matrix to turn elicitation into values for MDI
calculation. Figure adapted from Commander, Navy Installations Command
(2018).
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The second two survey questions assess the interruptability and replaceability of facility
functions, and their answers are used to assess its interdependency score. Interdependency
is intended to measure the relationship of a facility to other facilities in different missions.
The following interdependency questions and responses are reproduced verbatim from
Commander, Navy Installations Command (2018):
Question 3 (Interdependency / Interruptability): How long could the services
provided by (named Functional Area) be interrupted before impacting your mission
readiness?
N: None (Must be maintained continuously (24/7)).
B: Brief (minutes or hours not to exceed 24 hours).
S: Short (days not to exceed 7 days or hours).
P: Prolonged (more than a week).
Question 4 (Interdependency / Replaceability): How difficult would it be to
replace or replicate the services provided by (named Functional Area) with another
provider from any source?
I: Impossible (there are no known redundancies or excess/surge capacities avail-
able, or there are no viable commercial alternatives – only this site/command
can provide these services).
X: Extremely Difficult (there are minimally acceptable redundancies or ex-
cess/surge capacities available, or there are viable commercial alternatives,
but not readily available contract mechanism in place to replace these ser-
vices).
D: Difficult (services exist and are available, but the form of delivery is ill de-
fined or will require a measurable and unbudgeted level of effort to obtain
(money/man-hours), but mission readiness capabilities would not be compro-
mised in the process)
P: Possible (services exist, are available, and are well defined).
Upon completion of Question 3 and 4, an interdependency score is calculated using matrix
shown in Figure 1.2. The interdependency score is called MD1, referring to “Mission
Dependency Between” facilities functions across missions.
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Figure 1.2. Calculation of Mission Interdependency Score. Interdependency is
calculated using a similar process to intradependency. Experts answer Ques-
tions 3 and 4 for facilities to determine how interdependent the mission is
with other facilities and missions on the installation. Expert responses are
then input into this matrix to turn elicitation into values for MDI calculation.
Figure adapted from Commander, Navy Installations Command (2018).
Intradependency is calculated only once for a single facility function within a mission. For
example, a pump station providing water to an installation will only receive one MD| score
from the water mission SME. However, that same facility function can be interdependent
with multiple other missions and can have many MD1 scores. Continuing the example, the
same pump station can have # MD1 scores, where # is the number of facility functions
that require water. For this reason, the final score for a facility used for MDI calculation is
the mean of all MD8
1










1.1.2 Step 2: MDI Calculation
After determining intradependency and interdependency, the MDI score for a facility is
calculated as a function of MD|, MD0{1 , and # with the following equation (Commander,
Navy Installations Command 2018):
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+ 0.1 × ln #] − 15.5. (1.2)
Once its MDI score is calculated, a facility is then assigned an MDI Category. The MDI
categories used in the USN are presented in Figure 1.3. MDI categories are ultimately used
to guide infrastructure decision-making and funding prioritization.
Figure 1.3. Mission Dependency Index Categories. Once facility intradepen-
dency and interdependency scores are calculated, Equation 1.2 is used to
calculate MDI. MDI scores on their own are often not used for decision-
making. Instead, MDI scores are input into this table to prioritize different
facilities and missions. Figure adapted from Commander, Navy Installations
Command (2018).
Example 1: Sample MDI Calculation
We present a realistic exampleMDI calculation to show the entire process. For this example,
we calculate the MDI for a gymnasium that is part of an installation fitness mission.
The fitness mission SME determines that for survey Question 1 the gymnasium could be
interrupted for less than 24 hours before adverse impact to the fitness mission (B, briefly).
The SME then answers Question 2 that it is not possible to move the functions provided by
the gymnasium to another facility (I, impossible). Using the table in Figure 1.1 to interpret
these responses results, the gym is assigned MD| = 5.5.
Next, we assume only one facility function from the training mission depends on the
gymnasium (# = 1). Thus, a SME from the training mission provides responses to MDI
Questions 3 and 4 for the gym. The training mission determines that the interruption of the
gym would have a impact training within 1-7 days (S, short), but it is possible to replace
the gym mission (i.e., training outside) (P, possible). Using these responses, the table in
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Figure 1.2 results in the gymMD0{
1
= 2.0 (with only one interdependent facility, this is the
average value).
Once the survey is done, Equation 1.2 is used to calculate for the gymnasium’s MDI score.
We find:

















The MDI score of 79.38 would place the gymnasium into the MDI category of “significant”
as per the table in Figure 1.3.
1.2 MDI and DoD Infrastructure Decisions
The perceived benefits of MDI are established in DoD doctrine and requirements. For
example, the Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) instruction for MDI makes
the following claims about its efficacy (Commander, Navy Installations Command 2018):
• “MDI evaluates the installation’s ability to support the Warfare Enterprise’s mission
should the infrastructure be damaged or destroyed.”
• “MDI ....captures the operational mission impacts of facility degradation or outage.”
• MDI “ensures limited resources are prioritized and allocated properly.”
MDI also helps DoD services meet requirements set by the Office of the President of the
United States for asset management. Executive Order (EO) 13377 entitled “Federal Real
Property Asset Management” (2004) was intended to improve the agency asset management
planning process that measures life-cycle cost estimations, including costs of acquiring,
repairing, maintaining, operating, managing, and disposing assets and facilities. This re-
quired agencies to not only use life-cycle cost estimation, but also a method of prioritization
(Nichols 2015).
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MDI addresses the section of EO 13327 requiring agencies to validate funding through
methods of prioritization. As such, MDI gained popularity across the DoD and has since
been adopted by several agencies. Some of the larger agencies to date include:
• USN (Commander, Navy Installations Command 2018),
• U.S. Air Force (USAF) (Weniger 2018),
• U.S. Army (USA) (Grussing et al. 2010),
• National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) (National Aeronautics and
Space Administration 2010), and
• Department of Energy (DOE) (NNSA Office of Safety, Infrastructure & Operations
2017).
Each of these organizations has made changes to the original MDI concept first proposed
by Antelman and Miller (2002). These changes may be in the assigned values, range and
depth of ordinal questions, or other aspects of the framework. Even with these changes they
all use MDI in essentially the same way: to determine facility importance on mission and
thus, how critical it is.
MDI directly assists decision makers in prioritization of funding. Table 1.1 breaks down
how much each agency that uses MDI has requested in spending for Fiscal Year (FY) 2021.
Taken together, MDI is used to request nearly $20 billion dollars across the services.
Table 1.1. Fiscal Year 2021 U.S. Infrastructure Budget Using Mission De-
pendency Index for Justification ($ in Millions).
Agency $ Source
USN 3,523.1 Chief Financial Officer, Comptroller (2020)
USAF 3,388.5 Chief Financial Officer, Comptroller (2020)
USA 3,882.1 Chief Financial Officer, Comptroller (2020)
NASA 539.1 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (2020)
DOE 8,613.4 Office of Chief Financial Officer (2020)
Total 19,946.2 * Figures are based from FY21 projections
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1.3 Challenges with the Mission Dependency Index
Despite broad adoption across the DoD and Federal agencies, the efficacy of MDI for
effective prioritization is disputed.Analysis of theMDI process reveals numerous issueswith
the program. Kujawski and Miller (2009) challenge claims made by the MDI developers.
Their challenges include (Kujawski and Miller 2009):
• MDIdoes not employORMtechniques as prescribed byOffice of theChief
of Naval Operations (2018), which describes risk assessment according
to the severity and probability of an event.
• MDI relies on expert elicitation where SMEs are asked ordinal questions
pertaining to facilities and structures under their purview. The resultant
numbers associated with the questions are then manipulated using multi-
plication and division, which is not an acceptable use of ordinal numbers.
• MDI is not a simple process that can be used alone to guide decision
makers.
• MDI can wrongfully prioritize funding to projects.
• MDI does not link facilities to mission importance.
• The validity of the validation analysis was based more on advocacy than
science.
In addition to the examples given by Kujawski and Miller (2009), Command, Navy Installa-
tions Command Instructions (CNICINST) 11100.1A states that “The MDI is an operational
risk metric describing the relative importance of shore facilities in terms of their mission
criticality” (Commander, Navy Installations Command 2018). However relative importance
would imply that each facility is considered in relation or in proportion to another facility.
Later in the instruction, it states;
The scoring nomenclature is divided into five categories, with 15-point spreads
separating the critical, significant, relevant andmoderate levels. TheMDI equa-
tion is weighted to allow Functional Elements with high interdependency scores
to move up to the next level of criticality. Facilities within the same MDI Cat-
egory should receive similar attention. For example, a facility with a 75 score
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is of similar significance as a facility with a score of 82 (Commander, Navy
Installations Command 2018).
Thus, the facility with a score of 75 is the same in relation to the facility with a score of
82. Therefore, funding could go to a less important facility simply because of the lack of
relative importance.
MDI also uses confusing terminology that can mislead readers and decision makers alike.
For example, one of the categoriesMDImay assess a facility is “critical”. However, this does
not mean that facility necessarily falls into the DoD definition of Critical Infrastructure and
Key Resources (CIKR) which is the infrastructure and assets vital to the nation’s security,
governance, public health and safety, economy, and public confidence (Joint Chiefs of Staff
2020).
Despite identifying these flaws with MDI, their implications have never been quantitatively
measured, nor has there been analysis that considers the potential for sub-optimal decisions
resulting from the use of MDI. One reason these issues have yet to be assessed is because
the implications of MDI on missions and related facilities are rarely considered. MDI
focuses on expert elicitation of individual SMEs, and its use might be overlooking facility
interdependency and mission needs that are difficult to measure on an asset-by-asset basis.
In contrast, the operations and protection of the critical infrastructure systems that support
these facilities with power, water, fuel, mobility, communications and other services can
change dramatically given different distributions of facilities across networks. Moreover, it
is unclear how changingMDI scores for facilities at a single installation affects prioritization
across multiple installations and regions. In all cases, the implications of MDI scoring is
only understood by assessing the network effects onmission operations and regional funding
decisions.
1.4 Thesis Goals
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the flaws inherent in MDI with technical rigor and to
identify ways to improve MDI calculation for guiding infrastructure decisions.
In this work, we wish to show how the MDI survey and calculation process can lead to sub-
optimal decisions. We aim to identify precise mathematical flaws with MDI and generate
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reproducible examples that show these flaws.
In addition, our analysis is meant is to provide precise ways to overcome these flaws.
Specifically, we develop amodel that overcomes the flaws by developing a newmathematical
formalism for MDI based on network science and building on established methods in
operations research related to infrastructure vulnerability analysis. Our work results in one
example of a more internally consistent model for MDI that can be easily adopted within
the USN and across DoD services.
Overall, this thesis aims to contribute to improving our understanding of a widespread
decision-making metric used within the DoD. Providing a single example of how MDI can
be misused or lead to sub-optimal decisions can have widespread implications for nearly
$20 B in funding decisions. Providing an example of a new model for MDI that supports




MDI was developed based on literature in infrastructure analysis and operations research.
In this chapter, we review literature on critical infrastructure risk and vulnerability as a
characteristic body of knowledge integrating these fields for the proposes of infrastructure
protection. We also review methods for representing critical infrastructure systems as net-
works and the services they provide to military missions as flows. Related literature on
network interdiction informs key methods for measuring the impacts of critical infrastruc-
ture failures on missions.
2.1 Risk, Vulnerability, and Mission Dependency Index
The development and use of MDI is based on well-established practices for risk analysis
found across critical infrastructure sectors and systems (Commander, Navy Installations
Command 2018). In general, risk is defined in the USN by Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 3500.39D 2018 as the “Chance of adverse outcome
or bad consequence, such as failed or degraded mission, injury, illness, or loss. Risk level
is expressed in terms of hazard probability and severity.” Quantitative measures of risk
relate this definition by considering the likelihood of threats, asset or system vulnerability,
and a measure of failure consequences (Kaplan and Garrick 1981), sometimes called the
risk triplet. The risk triplet has been widely applied in critical infrastructure systems to
prioritize the protection of assets vulnerable to natural disaster and terrorist attacks and
related methods are currently used in frameworks for U.S. homeland security (Willis et al.
2018; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2018). For example, Willis (2007) studied
terrorism risk for critical infrastructure using the following quantitative definition:
'8B: = )ℎA40C ×+D;=4A018;8C~ × >=B4@D4=24 (2.1)
where;
• Threat = ?(event occurs)
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• Vulnerability = ?(event results in damage | event occurs)
• Consequence = [damage | event occurs and results in damage]
For example, consider a military base that is situated in a hurricane-prone area. The threat
is the possibility of a hurricane near the installation. Vulnerability can be thought of as the
probability a facility is damaged in the storm. The consequence is the average amount of
damage to a facility given there is a storm that effects the facility.
Despite the widespread use of quantitative risk methods for infrastructure risk analysis, Cox
(2008a, 2009) and Brown and Cox (2011b,a) challenge the application of the risk triplet
for terrorism and adversarial risks experienced in military systems. The authors argue that
the treatment of terrorist threats via conditional probabilities leads to spurious critical
infrastructure protection recommendations and makes assumptions about an adversary’s
capability and intent to perform an attack. In general, neither the capability nor intent
of an attacker can be known, making any probabilistic representation of this information
inaccurate. Brown and Cox (2011a) offer a list of possible methods that overcome these
issues, with particular focus on interdictionmethods for networked infrastructure systems. In
response, both Brown and Cox (2011b) (and more recently Alderson et al. (2015)) present
how interdiction studies are more appropriate for large-scale terrorism threats because
this form of analysis provides decision support for worst-case failures without making
assumptions about adversary capability or intent.
Eisenberg (2020) builds upon the distinctions among methods for risk analysis to define
multiple perspectives on critical infrastructure vulnerability. In particular, Eisenberg (2020)
suggests that methods promoted by Willis (2007) and Cox (2008a) support protection
from different disruptions because they focus on different ways infrastructure systems are
vulnerable to threats. This distinction is based on different perspectives on threats and
consequences. Eisenberg (2020) defines two perspectives on threats:
• Probable threats are events that have a frequency of occurrence that can be evaluated.
Probable threats generally have significant historical data indicating how likely the
disruption will occur, such as floods.
• Possible threats are events that do not occur with any assumed frequency or like-
lihood. In general, adversarial perspectives on probable threats focus on unlikely,
worst-case disruptions based on attacker budget. An example of a possible event
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would be the combined loss of all backup systems to a mission-critical asset.
Eisenberg (2020) also defines two perspectives on consequences:
• Known consequences have a characteristic measure and some known range of out-
comes. Known consequences can be measured given either probable or possible
threats. For example, the impact in dollars of the loss of an infrastructure asset.
• Unknown consequences do not require characteristic measures or do not have a well
defined range of outcomes. Here, the implications of probable and possible events
are either not considered or not measured. For example, many mission continuity of
operations plans are made without full knowledge of how, when, or what impacts
occur when assets fail.
Together, these four perspectives relate to four characteristic approaches to measure infras-
tructure vulnerability referred to as the four horsemen of critical infrastructure vulnerability.
Figure 2.1 illustrates how using these sub-categories generates a matrix with 4 types of vul-
nerability assessments. The itemized list below was adapted from (Eisenberg 2020):
• Risks: Risk analysis uses probabilistic measures of threat likelihood and known mea-
sures of threat consequences. The combination of this information focuses attention
on expected system disruptions and expected vulnerabilities. This case is best repre-
sented by insurance, which is meant to invest now for a probable event in the future
with a known cost. Risks can be evaluated through probability and statistics.
• Adversaries:Adversarial analysis considers possible threats with knownmeasures of
threat consequences. This quadrant emphasizes worst-case vulnerabilities identified
with game theoretic methods that consider an event or group of events that leads
to the worst outcome for an infrastructure systems. Thus, adversarial vulnerabilities
focus attention on worst-case disruptions and were originally developed in the U.S.
military. These vulnerabilities are often modeled with optimization models.
• Failures: Infrastructure will naturally fail if left unattended. Reliability engineering
uses probabilistic measures of infrastructure due to design, (mis)operation, and end-
of-life. Reliability-based methods focus on making infrastructure and systems that
continue to function and ignore the consequences of their failure. Thus, reliability
focuses on making fault tolerant and redundant systems and emphasizes engineering.
Reliability-related vulnerabilities can be identified using systems modeling.
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• Surprises: Organizations that operate and manage infrastructure are complex and
infrastructure can fail due to the outcomes of decisions across organizations. Impor-
tantly, decisions meant to protect systems and users can backfire due to unforeseen
and unintended consequences. These unexpected events are referred to as surprises.
Surprises are identified usingmethods for safety and resilience engineering to identify
how issueswith organizational structure, culture, and decision authoritymeant to keep
systems running can lead to failure. Often surprises are mitigated with emergency
plans that are developed without knowing the consequences of threats. Surprise-based
vulnerabilities are studied with qualitative research methods and case study analysis
of organizations and through exercises and gaming with decision-makers.
Figure 2.1. Eisenberg (2020) quad chart depicting the four types of vulner-
abilities and their relationships with the likelihood and consequence of an
event.
The critique of terrorism risk analysis provided by Brown and Cox (2011b) and discussion
of critical infrastructure vulnerabilities provided by Eisenberg (2020) informs the methods
useful for assessing the efficacy of MDI. The IRR factors embedded in MDI are meant
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to quantify the consequences of facility and infrastructure loss. Thus, Eisenberg (2020)
would classify MDI as providing either a risk or adversarial perspective on installation
vulnerability. Accordingly, MDI claims to be a risk assessment tool modeled from the
USN ORM policy (Commander, Navy Installations Command 2018) and employs similar
methods for decision prioritization via risk matrices. However, MDI calculation never takes
into account the probability of an event happening (Kujawski and Miller 2009), making it
not an effective risk measure (Hubbard 2020).
The use of MDI is more akin to a worst-case or adversarial measure of vulnerability and
prioritization.MDI as ameans to prioritize facilities within an installation against worst-case
vulnerabilities aligns with military mission planning because it cares more about mission
assurance than expected risks. The IRR factors included in MDI align with adversarial
measures by focusing on the consequences facility failures have on mission rather than the
reasons the facility fails. Yet, the use of risk matrices diminishes MDI as a means to inform
adversarial risks (Cox 2008b) and the implementation of MDI suffers from numerous issues
identified by Brown and Cox (2011a).
Taken together, analyzing the efficacy of MDI for facility prioritization decisions is best
informed by both risk and adversarial methods. MDI calculation includes elements of
both risk and adversarial methods, but employs only partial elements of both. MDI uses
risk-based prioritization through expert elicitation and matrix calculations, but does not
consider the probability of threats. Assessing the efficacy of MDI as a risk measure would
include simulation and statistical analysis of scenarios that threaten infrastructure systems.
In contrast, MDI is also based on IRR factors and tries to inform worst-case disruptions.
Assessing the efficacy of MDI also requires consideration of methods suggested by Brown
and Cox (2011a), including network optimization, network interdiction, and related game
theoretic methods for worst-case vulnerability analysis.
2.2 Infrastructure Networks and Vulnerabilities
One of the goals of this thesis is to connect the MDI of facilities to the critical infras-
tructure systems that support facilities with services like electricity, fuel, water, mobility,
and telecommunications among others. There is significant research on risk and adversarial
vulnerabilities to infrastructure systems. The majority of these works rely on developing a
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network model of critical infrastructure systems to represent their structure and function.
We review network science literature for representing missions and infrastructure that in-
forms the connection of facility MDI to supporting systems and related risk and adversarial
vulnerability analyses.
2.2.1 Network Representations of Infrastructure Systems and Mis-
sions
There are numerous ways in which systems can be represented as networks. A network is
a mathematical graph of nodes connected by links representing nodal relationships, such
as a social network of people connected by links representing who-knows-whom (Newman
2018). Many complex systems can be represented as networks, such as biological, social,
economical, and infrastructure. For example, supporting infrastructure systems like electric
power grids (Pagani and Aiello 2013), water systems (Yazdani and Jeffrey 2011), and roads
(Ganin et al. 2017) are oftenmodeled and assessed as networks.MDI itself creates a network
as the relationship from one facility on another quantifying mission impacts. Specifically,
in an MDI network, facilities and mission sets are represented by nodes or vertices and their
connections to one another by edges or arcs represent intra- and interdependency.
Linking multiple network models together into multilayer networks (Kivela et al. 2014)
supports further understanding across systems andmissions.Natural and engineered systems
on installations often rely on more than one type of commodity for operation and mission
assurance. Military installations are similar to small cities and rely on electricity, water,
fuel, communications, and roads. These systems can be studied together using multilayer
networks, where each layer may represent a different type of commodity (Kivela et al. 2014).
Multilayer networks related to military infrastructure are often studied as either physical
systems and social systems. For example, it is possible to study interdependent facilities
without considering missions and still assess how facilities supports civilian and military
needs. In his works concerning urban infrastructure, Derrible (2017b,a) explores aspects of
urban infrastructure planning. The author assesses centralized-decentralized and integrated-
separated methods through complex systems science. Derrible (2017b,a) show the effects
of different planning paradigms on the network representation of urban infrastructure.
In addition to informing planning decisions, numerous network models of interdependent
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infrastructure systems support advances for MDI. MDI relies heavily on assessing the inter-
dependent relationship between facilities of different mission types. These interdependent
relationships introduce new ways in which failures can ripple or cascade from one mission
type to another. Ouyang (2014) reviews multiple approaches to model interdependent in-
frastructure systems and their implications for resilience. The author provides a conceptual
basis for understanding interdependency across mission networks.
One key factor affecting MDI is network flows across interdependent systems. Ouyang
(2014) identify numerousmethods that analyze infrastructure in a static state similar toMDI.
Yet, the flow of services across infrastructure systems suggests that a survey conducted at
a moment in time does not address multiple realizations of possible interdependencies and
their potential for disruptive affects (Goldbeck et al. 2019). These interdependent models
may have numerous layers representing different mission or commodities types and have
increased in proficiency (Enayaty Ahangar et al. 2020).
Multilayer networks also support models that connect physical and social systems together.
Barker et al. (2017) evaluate the relationship between networks and resilience through
modeling, quantification, and management. They interpret both cyber-physical and social
networks to understand interdependent infrastructure dependence. This work is further
forwarded by Sharkey et al. (2020) in which resilience is evaluated with greater detail
investigating robustness, rebound, extensibility, and adaptability.
Whereas work by Sharkey et al. (2020) emphasize the function and disruption of physical
networks, networks are also used by other authors to study impacts to decision-making and
missions. For example, Eisenberg et al. (2018) reviews military and civilian C2 systems
though “Network Centric Warfare.” The authors present C2 as a multilayer network involv-
ing physical, informational, social, and cognitive systems and how the interrelate with each
other. MDI is a direct extension of these types of relationships, and relates to the social and
cognitive networks meant to enable missions. MDI also includes facilities that house C2
and the infrastructure required to supply the necessary resources.
Eisenberg et al. (2020, 2017) build on multilayer networks and C2 theory to show the
relationships between infrastructure and social networks for large-scale civilian systems.
The authors examine power grid resilience in SouthKorea and howblackouts lead to different
decision-making scenarios. Unlike other articles that try to determine system resilience by
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metrics placed on a network flow model, they evaluate the power grid as a mission. In other
words, they evaluate the interdependence of both the power grid and the social network of
those who operate the network, which the authors dub sociotechnical network analysis.
Overall, multilayer networks provide a helpful formalism for representing and analyzing
MDI. MDI itself is a network and the supporting facilities on missions that it measures are
often studied as networks. Intradependencies can be studied using independent networks
for physical and social aspects of MDI. Interdependencies across systems can be assessed
via links and flows across network layers. This is possible for systems with both physical
and social networks, such as military C2 systems and sociotechnical systems.
Networks are also an important formalism because disruptions to infrastructure and organi-
zations can be measured via the interdiction of nodes and arcs. Multilayer networks support
support both risk and adversarial vulnerability analyses. Here, we review aspects of both
analyses.
2.2.2 Infrastructure Network Risks
Risks are vulnerabilities that consider probability of a threat occurrence and the severity of
the consequences when the system is disrupted. Applying risk analysis to a network model
can identify potential hazards to a system and support improving resilience. Common risks
include natural disasters that have significant historical precedent to guide measures of
likelihood and intensity.
Numerous studies consider natural disaster risks on infrastructure systems at the scale of
military installations. For example, studies have assessed the impacts of hurricanes and
flooding on critical infrastructure in the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) territory, which is
comprised of islands roughly the size of military installations. Good (2014) and Routley
(2020) analyze disruptions to the road networks and their risk to hurricanes and flooding
across the territory. Moeller (2020) and Wine (2020) study impacts to telecommunications
infrastructure, including backbone fiber internet and wireless cell phone services. Wille
(2019) analyzed the impacts of hurricane winds and storm surge on USVI electric power and
water distribution systems. All studies utilize some form of network model for representing
systems and their interdependent function.
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Risks also relate to human decision-making and networked missions. For example, various
authors studied the grouping of optimal personnel and resources for missions tasking while
managing the risk of execution cost or work quality (Beavers 2019; Diaz 2019). These
scheduling and task networks models can be further broadened to evaluate forms of risk not
centered around probability or a specific threat. They can be used to evaluate how surprise,
or unforeseeable, disaster can affect systems that were never built to handle such an event
(Eisenberg et al. 2019).
At an intersection where network analysis meet risks, the incorporation of MDI elements
can be explored. The worst case scenario that IRR factors analyze can be implemented
to evaluate risk by connecting the concept of facilities onto infrastructure networks. This
analysis can provide insight to determine the impacts of MDI inter-relationships to change
and conclude if MDI is truly a measure of facility importance.
2.2.3 Network Interdiction and Adversarial Methods
Adversarial modeling with networks focuses on interdiction of flow networks. Interdiction
is the action taken by adversary the with the purpose of blocking or increasing the cost of
movement of a commodity that an operator is trying to optimize across a network (Smith
and Song 2020). Sometimes described as leader-follower games, for the context of this
paper they will be refereed to as Attacker / Defender (AD) models. In this respect the terms
defender and operator are synonymous. Below is the reproduction of the key assumptions
noted by Smith and Song (2020) when employing AD models.
1: All information concerning the network is known to both the attacker and defender.
2: The attacker understands optimization and has the resources to employ algorithms
quickly. In this sense the attacker fully understands the effect his attack has on the
network.
3: The attacker is attempting to reverse the objective of the defender. Thus, if the defender
is attempting to minimize a system the attacker is attempting to maximize and vice
versa.
4: In a given round both the attacker and defender make one decision. The attacker
would first decide on its attack followed by the defender’s response.
5: The game consists of one round only.
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These types of models are extremely useful in military applications. Network interdiction
gained popularity during the VietnamWar where interdiction techniques were employed on
enemy supply routes (Steinrauf 1991). Interdiction models were applied to the war on drugs.
Using the network models to simulate the flow of both drugs and the precursor chemicals
needed to synthesize them through roads and rivers this information could then be used to
optimize interdiction efforts (Steinrauf 1991; Wood 1993). These early models were from
the reference frame of the attacker. They focused on the best ways to disrupt networks in
the forms of supply chains.
Focusing on how to make the most impactful disruption to networks reveals the best ways to
protect them. Applying this to defense of facilities, from an MDI perspective may identify
bottlenecks or key assets that if you protect will maintain network functionality through
possible disruptions (Brown et al. 2006).
The practice and approach to prioritizing how to actually protect facilities become nuanced
and not so clear using this method for various reasons. For example, a facility that has a
critical MDI score may receive funding that would lower its score, but in doing so you have
suddenly made other facilities more likely to be targeted from an attacker perspective as
they now have the highest MDI in the network.
Alderson et al. (2014) dismiss the evaluation of a single asset and prefer to think about
defense in terms of groups or networks that can provide normal rules for determining how
prioritization should occur for the optimal attack or defense of a network contributing to the
overall resilience of a system. This argument can be extended to MDI, where MDI focuses
only on the facility and those facilities that directly interact with it. Instead, by implementing
MDI as a network we can see what the true impacts that interruption may pose to facilities
that are further removed from an immediate interaction but could experience cascading
effects from interruption.
These models can provide great revelations about a network, but every network in different
and unique in its own way. To the end network interdiction does not lend itself to easy rules
or simple algorithms that can determine the most essential asset in a system (Alderson et al.
2013). Similar to asking what is the biggest pipe in the network and assuming that it is the
most essential link, the data was not informative in determining vulnerability of systems,
because these systems are functioning and the operators will direct flow as best they can to
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manage disruptions.
Alderson et al. (2015) details a notional fuel network. This particular study evaluated a
notional fuel network and showed all the worst case disruptions for various attack budgets,
best case defenses, given those attack budgets for using hardening of redundancy kinds of
options (Alderson et al. 2015)
To this point all models have been deterministic. This can lead to a misconception in results.
For example, the cost to move a commodity across a network may depend on weather. It may
be cheaper to send merchandise down southern routes when northern routes are covered
in snow. While it may be cold during the winter months in the north, it does not always
snow. Therefore, it may be useful to add robustness through stochastic processes (Delage
and Iancu 2015).
2.3 Contributing to MDI
We build on broad literature to assess the efficacy of MDI for facility prioritization and
funding decision making. First, we closely examine the MDI formula and calculations and
identify issues with the way MDI is used in the USN. We will align the MDI process to
network science models, specifically multilayer networks. In this process we will formalize
definitions associated with MDI. In doing so, we will search for imperfections in the MDI
methodology and provide recommendations using mathematical formalism. This critique
of MDI can then be used to generate models that are scalable, reproducible, and relates
missions to literature on the prioritization of facilities for funding.
Finally, this thesiswill evaluate alternativemethods of calculating dependency and criticality
using IRR factors, intradependencies, and interdependencies.
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CHAPTER 3:
Mission Dependency Index: Technical Definition and
Analysis
In this chapter, we dissect the MDI calculation process as defined by Antelman and Miller
(2002) and applied in the USN (Commander, Navy Installations Command 2018). MDI is
described in CNIC requirements as, “a survey that is an organized process of reviewing all
scored facilities to identify the intra- and inter- dependencies between functional/mission
areas and the risks associated with interrupting or relocating/replacing the functions that
take place in the facilities, from a planned outage perspective. MDI scores are calculated
based on survey data submitted during the interviews with installation functional and
mission SME” (Commander, Navy Installations Command 2018). Our example in Chapter 1
reproduces these instructions to show how the MDI survey and calculation process is
currently implemented across DoD services.
However, this common presentation of MDI does not provide a mathematical formalism
rigorous enough to applyMDI and easily reproduce results of previous studies. For example,
the MDI process is filled with terms like infrastructure and facility that are synonymous,
ambiguous, and easily misunderstood. MDI calculation also uses new terminology like
intradependency that is hard to understand. One goal with this chapter is to redefine the
MDI process using standardized terminology that enable reproducible models and results.
We achieve this by developing a mathematical formalism for MDI based on multilayer
networks (Kivela et al. 2014).
Our second goal is to use this mathematical formalism to identify flaws in MDI that can
lead to sub-optimal decisions. Our network formalism provides technical rigor that allows
us to develop examples that highlight and quantify the impacts of its technical flaws.
We demonstrate our critique using hypothetical and real examples relevant to military
installations.
Although never described in the literature in this way, MDI calculation is based on thinking
of installations as networks. When conducting an MDI survey, mission-owners and SMEs
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are asked to consider relationships across installation missions and facilities. This process
is very similar to the process used by scientists and researchers to create a network model
to asses risk and worst-case disruptions. As a result, the MDI process generates scores for
facilities that are similar to centrality scores for nodes in network models. We use this idea
to re-imagine MDI as a form of network analysis, rather than a general survey.
In what follows, we build up our network-based perspective on MDI. First, we define all
the key terminology and concepts and how they relate to networks. Then, we build on an
existing formalism for multilayer networks presented in Kivela et al. (2014) to define a
network formalism appropriate for MDI calculation. We further assess the sensitivity of
MDI calculation. Together, we provide rigor to the terminology, representation of systems,
and mathematical calculation embedded in the MDI survey and process
3.1 Redefining the Terminology of MDI
We redefine the following terminology to provide more rigor to MDI calculation via net-
works: missions, facilities, functions, dependency, disruption intradepedency, interdepen-
dency, and installations:
Mission.We start our new vision of MDI by defining the term mission. Missions are a
fundamental component of military systems and MDI calculation — something cannot be
mission-dependent without a definition of the term mission. However, while the word itself
is very common, the term mission is never explicitly defined in MDI literature. For this
reason, we define a mission as a specified goal completed for a military purpose.
There are at least two kinds of missions relevant for MDI calculation, each related to a
chain of command in the DoD. As described in Chapter 1, the DoD is split into two chain
of commands. The chain of command involved with infrastructure is the administrative
command that oversees the PESTONI pillars. In addition, there is the operational command
which plans and executes mission functions. In this fashion, MDI observes two types of
missions: administrative missions, referred to as A-missions, and operational missions,
referred to as O-missions.
In general, both A-missions and O-missions are conceptual in nature and can be comprised
of anything related to their predefined goal. For our purposes, we visually represent both
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mission types as clouds, such as A-mission Red shown in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1. Mission Representation. An MDI administrative mission, mis-
sion red, represented by a cloud. Examples of administrative missions may
include providing potable water to a certain area or group of facilities, pro-
viding housing for military personnel, establishing and maintaining C2, etc.
Operational missions are derived by operational commands. For the scope
of this paper and MDI and operational command is synonymous with oper-
ational mission. For example a helicopter squadron would be an operational
mission in terms of MDI.
Facility. The next key components of MDI are facilities. A facility is synonymous with, and
includes, any type of building or structure. For the purposes of MDI, the term facility also
means the portions of buildings that serve a single purpose (e.g., a sensitive compartmen-
talized information facility within a larger structure) and individual infrastructure assets
or equipment (e.g., a utility control panel on the side of a building). This means the term
facility is broad to include buildings, critical infrastructure (e.g., radar towers, substations,
etc.), and assets (e.g., a wind sock).
Overall, the only common defining factor across facilities is that they are tangible objects
geolocated in physical space. For our purposes, we visually represent facilities as cubes. We
show an example of this representation for a facility in A-mission Red in Figure 3.2.
Function. In addition to the concept of facility, there needs to be reason to relate a mission,
which is conceptual, and a facility, which is tangible — a facility has to “do” something in
order to support missions or interact with other facilities. To this point, we introduce the
concept of a function. We define a function as a service provided by or housed within a
facility. A mission is a concept that depends on functions to achieve the mission’s goal. In
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other words, functions are actions (e.g., pumping potable water, sheltering personnel, trans-
mitting communications, entertaining, etc.). Figure 3.2 represents function as a lightning
bolt.
It is the synergy between the facility and a function that allows us to understand the inter-
actions between facilities and missions. Combining the concepts of facilities and functions
produces the notion of a facility function. Like the term facility, facility functions are also
broad and vary from physical services (e.g., shelter) to social services (e.g., personnel man-
agement) or even weapons platforms (e.g., a ship). A single facility may provide multiple
functions to the same mission and/or across multiple missions. We represent the combina-
tion of function and facility together as a circle or node as shown in Figure 3.2 for A-mission
Red.
Figure 3.2. Facility Function Representation. The facility function (node) is
the combination of a function (lightning bolt) and a facility (cube). A single
facility can produce or house multiple functions, such that facility function
nodes can include multiple functions.
Dependency.MDI calculation is based on the relationships among facility functions and
missions. We call these relationships dependencies. We define a dependency as a both the
relationship between a facility function (node) and its mission (cloud) and as its relationship
to another facility function (node). Since dependencies relate multiple distinctMDI building
blocks (i.e., nodes to clouds and nodes to nodes), there is not single way to visually represent
a dependency.
Disruption. The goal of MDI is to assess the importance of facility function(s) to missions.
This importance is measured by the potential impacts across missions and facilities if a
facility function is lost. We define a disruption as the event, attack, or otherwise intervention
that interdicts or stops a facility function from supporting its mission or other facility
functions.
As described in Chapter 1, disruptions are considered in MDI calculation via IRR fac-
tors. For the purposes of our MDI formalism, we adopt the definitions of interruptability,
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relocatability, and replaceability as in Chapter 1.
With these definitions of mission, facility, function, dependency, and disruption, we can
now show the MDI process for ranking facilities by importance as a network analysis.
Intradependency. As described in Chapter 1, intradependency is one of the two key mea-
sures used to calculate MDI. The intradependency score, MD|, is the result of a survey
on facility function interruptability (Question 1) and relocateability (Question 2) (see: Sec-
tion 1.1.1). Survey responses are converted to MD| scores using Figure 1.1.
We base our definition of intradependency in networks on this process used in the USN. We
define intradependency as a measure that indicates the dependency of a mission (cloud)
on a facility function (node). Intradependency is a two-fold concept involving both the the
assignment of facility function to a mission and the scoring of the importance of that facility
function to its mission.
The first part of our definition is that interdependency involves the assignment of a facility
function to a mission. Facility functions are only assigned to a single mission. This assign-
ment implies that the mission owns the facility function and is in charge of its management.
It also implies that the mission depends on the facility function. Figure 3.3 illustrates the
assignment of facility functions (nodes) to A-Mission Red (cloud).
The second part of our definition of intradependency involves scoring the importance of a
facility function to its assigned mission — in other words, scoring how much the mission
depends on the facility function. This part of intradependency involves the IRR questions
and MD| score. IRR questions are answered by SMEs. When we refer to a SME, we
mean a person that is considered significantly knowledgeable on a mission’s goal and its
dependence on facility functions. By answering Question 1 and 2 of the MDI survey for a
given facility function, the SME effectively scores the importance of the facility function
with MD|. We consider these scores as weights on facility function nodes representing
the intradependency of each facility function on its mission. Figure 3.3 demonstrates this
second part of intradependency for A-mission Red via the MD| weights shown to the left
of each facility function node.
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Figure 3.3. Intradependency Representation. Facility functions (nodes 1-4)
have been assigned to A-Mission Red and therefore are represented as part
of the red cloud. A SME for A-Mission Red then answers Question 1 and
Question 2 of he MDI survey for each facility function. After the survey, each
facility function is assigned a weight (shown to the left of each node). These
weights are MD| scores from Figure 1.1. Each weight is on a scale from 1
to 6, where 6 has the most extreme impact to the mission.
Thus, intradependency is both an assignment of facility functions to missions and a weight
that correlates to the significance an interruption of facility function would have on its
mission. Intradependency weights are scaled between 1 and 6, where MD| = 6 implies
complete dependency of a mission on a facility function (Figure 1.1). In Figure 3.3, A-
Mission Red has the highest dependency on the facility function represented by node 2 and
has the lowest dependency on the facility function represented by node 4.
For a single mission, the MDI story might stop here. However, most missions do not
exist on their own. Normally, at a military installation, there are many missions, each
dependent on their respective facility functions. Picturing each mission as its own grouping
of facility functions, we can designate different missions by color (e.g., A-mission Red,
A-mission Blue, etc.). Figure 3.4 depicts four missions differentiated by color. We refer
to each individual mission as a mission layer. Three of the mission layers are A-missions
and the fourth is an O-mission. Additionally, each mission layer comprises intradependent
facility functions with their intradependency weights shown.
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Figure 3.4. Representing Multiple Missions at an Installation. An installation
often comprises multiple missions. Each mission can be considered a layer
and designated as a colored cloud. Mission clouds can be either A-missions
(i.e., Red, Blue, and Green) and O-missions (i.e., Yellow). Facility function
nodes assigned to each mission are colored to match their intradependent
mission. A SME for each A-mission determines intradependency scores MD|
for each facility function within their cloud. This is done via MDI survey
and answering Questions 1 and 2 (see Section 1.1.1). Facility functions in
O-missions do not receive intradependency scores (e.g., node 9).
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Considering multiple missions at the same installation reveals several important aspects of
the way MDI is calculated based on facility functions and intradependencies. First, some
facility functions do not have an intradependency score. Specifically, facility functions in
operational missions do not receive intradependency scores (e.g., Facility Function 9 in
O-mission Yellow). O-mission facility functions are comprised of operational units such as
helicopter squadrons or naval ships. These operational units do not fall under the purview
of the PESTONI pillars nor do they receive funding under the context of infrastructure.
Therefore, they do not receive an intradependency score nor an MDI score. With this
exception, operational missions and their respective facility functions handled just like their
administrative counterparts.
Figure 3.4 also shows how it is possible for a single facility to house multiple facility
functions. Both A-mission Red and A-mission Blue are dependent on node 1. This means
that their are at least two different functional capabilities housed in Facility 1. The distinction
between missions lies in the actual functions performed at facility 1. To differentiate, we
name the facility function that lies in A-mission Red, “Facility Function 1, Red” and the
facility function in A-mission Blue mission as “Facility Function 1, Blue”.
For example, take two different A-missions, such as the port operations mission and the
potable water mission, that are located in the same part of an installation. For these two
missions, there may be a single facility that houses offices for the port ops mission and a
large water pump for the potable water mission. Neither function is the same — the water
pump supports the potable water mission and offices support the port ops mission. However,
both missions being co-located in the same facility means SMEs from both missions may
assign an intradependency score to Facility 1. If we assume the port operations mission is
A-mission Red and the potable water mission is A-mission Blue, we find that A-mission Red
is less dependent on Facility 1 (MD| = 4.43) than the potable water mission (MD| = 5.5).
The choice of using both values separately, or only choosing the higher, lower, or average
value of these intradependency scores for Facility 1 can be at the discretion of the installation
commander. This choice has practical significance, as the higher an intradependency score,
the more likely a facility will receive prioritized funding. For example, if we assume
an installation commander concerned with the interruption of all functions equally at a
given facility, they might choose to give Facility 1 an MDI score based on MD| = 5.5.
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The most common practice in the DoD and NASA is to calculate MDI for each facility
function separately, then assign the facility the highest MDI score of these values (National
Aeronautics and Space Administration 2010). We follow this guidance, and assume when
multiple functions are located in the same facility, the highest MDI is chosen for final
calculation.
Interdependency. Also described in Chapter 1, interdependency is the second key measure
used to calculate MDI. The interdependency score, MD1, is the result of a survey on facility
function interruptability (Question 3) and replaceability (Question 4) (see: Section 1.1.1).
Survey responses are converted to MD1 scores using Figure 1.2.
Interdependency is also a two-fold concept that incorporates facility function relationships
and weighting together. Specifically, we define interdependency as a measure that indicates
the dependency of a facility function (node) on another facility function (node).
The definition and use of interdependency involves three parts.
The first part of interdependency is the assignment of a dependency of one facility function
on another facility function. Our definition of interdependency broadly includes any de-
pendency between any two facility functions (nodes). However, an important restriction on
MDI calculation is it only considers interdependencies between mission layers. Figure 3.5
illustrates examples of MDI interdependencies as dotted arrows connecting facility func-
tions (nodes) in different mission layers. Here, a facility function depends on another if the
arrow is pointing to it. For example, in Figure 3.5 Facility Function 5, Blue depends on
Facility Function 1, Red.
Figure 3.5 demonstrates that a key feature of interdependencies is their directionality. In
practice, a facility function in one mission (e.g., Facility Function 5, Blue) may depend on
another (e.g., Facility Function 1, Red), but the inversemay not be true (i.e., Facility Function
1, Red may not depend on Facility Function 5, Blue). For this reason, all interdependencies
are represented as directional arcs.
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Figure 3.5. Representing MDI Interdependencies. Interdependencies are best
represented as directed arcs between facility functions (nodes), where arcs
point towards the dependent facility function (e.g., Facility Function 5, Blue
depends on Facility Function 1, Red). MDI calculation as defined in the
USN is only concerned with interdependencies between mission layers. In-
terdependency also refers to the importance score (weight) assigned next to
each arc. This value is an MD1 score resulting from a SME answering MDI
survey Questions 3 (interruptability) and 4 (replaceability). MD1 scores are
normalized between 1 and 6, where 6 indicates the strongest level of inter-
dependency (see Figure 1.2). Interdependency also refers to a nodal weight
MD0{
1
that is mean MD1 score for all interdependencies # for a facility func-
tion (i.e., mean weighted out-degree). We do not show these nodal weights
as they are easily calculated based on interdependencies shown.
The second part of interdependency involves the scoring of the importance of facility
function dependencies — in other words, scoring how much the facility functions in one
mission depend on facility functions in another. This part of interdependency involves the
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IRR questions and MD1 score. Similar to intradependency, IRR questions are answered
by SMEs. Presumably, the same SME knowledgeable about intradependencies within a
mission is also knowledgeable about interdependencies between missions. By answering
Question 3 and 4 of the MDI survey for a given facility function, the SME effectively scores
the importance of the facility function on another with an MD1 score. We consider these
scores as weights on arcs representing the strength of interdependency between facility
functions. Figure 3.5 demonstrates this second part of interdependency for via the weights
shown next to each interdependency arc.





is a function of arc weights, specifically, it is the mean of the MD1
weights for all facility functions that depend on it (see Equation 1.1). For example, in
Figure 3.5 both Facility Function 1, Red and Facility Function 6, Green would receive an
MD0{
1
= 2.4. This happens even though Facility Function 1, Red has only one interde-
pendency and Facility Function 6, Green has two. This discrepancy is dealt with in MDI
calculation by also assigning each node a value # equal to its out-degree (e.g., #1,'43 = 1
whereas #6,A44= = 2). # is used both in MD0{1 and MDI calculations (i.e., Equation 1.1
and 1.2, respectively). Because both # and MD0{
1
are functions of the interdependencies
shown and easily calculated, we do not label facility function nodes with their # and MD0{
1
values in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5 also shows that only some facility functions will be given MD1 scores. For
example, for A-mission Red, Facility Functions 2 and 4 do not receive anyMD1 scores. This
is common and the MDI calculation process and dealt with explicitly in USN instructions
(Commander, Navy Installations Command 2018). Specifically, facility functions without
interdependencies are assigned and MD0{
1
= 0 and # = 1 for final MDI calculation.
Installation. Figure 3.5 presents all necessary concepts for MDI calculation. From this
simple image, we can now define what an installation is. We define an installation as one
set of all facility functions that physically reside inside a US base, camp, or fort organized
into missions. The existence of an installation is justified by one or more of the missions it
contains.
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3.2 Viewing MDI with a Multilayer Networks
Given our definition of an installation, we present a formal definition of an installation
as a multilayer network using notation adapted from Kivela et al. (2014). This formalism
supports MDI calculation as conducted in the USN:
• An installation is a multilayer network graph  such that  = (+" , " , ", j).
Here, " is the set of layers in the multilayer network each representing a mission
at the installation, +" is the set of facility functions at the installation, " is the
set of interdependencies connecting facility functions, and j is a mapping function
assigning facility functions to missions.
• A mission is a network layer comprised of the set of facility function nodes +" and
interdependency arcs " . Setting " to < yields a mission network layer that is a
graph  (+<, <).
• The two types of missions — administrative and operational — are subsets of " ,
such that A-missions are in " ⊆ " , O-missions are in "$ ⊆ " , " ∪ "$ = " ,
and " ∩ "$ = ∅.
• A facility function is a node 8 ∈ +" representing a tuple ( 5 , B), where 5 is the
physical facility and B is the function it houses or produces. A single facility can
house or produce multiple functions, such that two nodes 8 and 9 can have the same
5 . Similarly, two different facilities can house or produce the same function B, such
that 8 and 9 can have the same B. However, all facility function tuples are unique, such
that 8 ≠ 9 ,∀ 5 ∈ ,∀B ∈ (.
• j is a mapping function assigning a facility function node 8 to a mission layer:
j : 8 −→ +" . j also assigns a SME to conduct the MDI survey for the given facility
function.
• An interdependency is a directed arc, denoted (8, 9), linking one facility function
node 8 to another facility function node 9 , where 8 ≠ 9 . The set " is the set of all
interdependencies in the multilayer network.
• MDI interdependencies are the arcs (8, 9) used forMDI calculation, such that "
"
⊆
" . Here, an arc (8, 9) is in "" if assigned nodes j : 8 −→ +< and j : 9 −→ += are
in different mission layers (< ≠ =).
• A node intradependency score (MD|) is a node weight assigned by a SME associated
with the dependency of an A-mission network layer on a facility function node. MD|
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are only assigned for nodes with the following: j : 8 −→ +<,∀< ∈ ". MD| is
calculated using the USN MDI process.
• An arc interdependency score (MD1) is an arc weight assigned by a SME associated
with the dependency of one facility function on another. MD1 are only assigned for
arcs (8, 9) ∈ "
"
. MD1 is calculated using the USN MDI process.
• A node interdependency score (MD0{
1
) is an node weight calculated as the mean
weighted out-degree of a facility function node.
• The value # is the out-degree of a facility function node.
Taken together, we can use this network formalism to redefine MDI scores as a multilayer
network centrality. Specifically, an MDI score is a centrality score assigned to facility
5 given the surveyed dependencies of all mission layers " in an installation multilayer
network  (+" , " , ", j) on facility functions 8 ∈ +<. MDI scores are determined using
intradependency and interdependency node weights (MD| and MD0{1 , respectively), and
node out-degree # (for (8, 9) ∈ "
"
). The MDI for each facility function 8 is calculated
with Equation 1.2. A facility 5 is assigned MDI = max{MDI1, . . . ,MDI: } for : nodes with
tuples ( 5 , B),∀B ∈ (. MDI is normalized between 0 to 100. A facility with MDI = 0 means
its functions in its assigned A-mission(s) have no impact on any mission if disrupted and a
facility with MDI = 100 means its functions in its A-mission(s) have the highest possible
impact on missions if disrupted.
Figure 3.6 presents a example of a installation multilayer network using this formalism.
Our definition of an installation multilayer network is an adapted version of the node-
colored network and interdependent network-of-networks formalism in Kivela et al. (2014).
Specifically, in a installation multilayer network, missions are equivalent to colors (layers)
and facility functions are equivalent to nodes mapped to a color. The additional elements
unique to installation multilayer networks include the inclusion of two mission layer aspects
(administrative and operational), the relationship between the mapping function j andMDI
survey, the possibility for a facility to exist in multiple mission layers, the restriction to only
use directional arcs, the specialized subsets necessary for MDI calculation, and the methods
for node and arc weighting. We refer the reader to Kivela et al. (2014) for other applications
of node-colored networks and to compare our installation multilayer network with other
multilayer networks.
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Figure 3.6. A Complete Installation Multilayer Network for MDI Calculation.
Our installation multilayer network formalism can be used to mathematically
represent the network visualized in this figure. The network  (+" , " , ", j)
consists of |" | = 4, where |" | = 3 (Red, Blue, and Green), and |"$ | = 1
(Yellow). |+< | = 10, where facilities 2 to 9 only have one representative
facility function node, and facility 1 has two (Red and Blue). The mapping
function j assigns facility functions to mission layers, such as j : 1 −→
{+'43 , +;D4}. |" | = 9 where only arcs shown with dotted lines are in "" .
Node intradependency scores and arc interdependency scores are shown. The
MDI for each facility 2 to 8 can be calculated directly using the MD|, MD1,
and out-degree # of their respective facility function nodes. In contrast, the
MDI of facility 1 would be <0G{MDI1,'43 ,MDI1,;D4} and facility function
9 does not receive an MDI score for being in an O-mission. While MDI
has never been conceived in this way prior, we find this implementation has
several benefits for understanding issues with MDI calculation. For example,
there are elements within our formalism that currently do not affect MDI
calculations, such as interdependency arcs within mission layers (solid arcs).
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3.3 MDI Concepts Revealed by Networks
Our mathematical formalism and Figure 3.6 demonstrate that there are several complicated
aspects of MDI calculation that can lead to misunderstandings.
First, MDI scores are attributed to a facility, not a facility function. However, all the values
used to calculate MDI—MD|, MD1, and #—are all attributed to facility functions. We
have discussed that multiple functions can be located in the same facility. When this event
occurs every facility function determines what its overall MDI score would be if no other
function was located at the facility. The MDI scores for all the functions are then compared
and the highest MDI score is chosen to represent the facility as a whole. This score is then
used to assign a MDI category based on a range of values. This process of assessing facility
functions and scoring facilities is easily misunderstood and may be implemented differently
across missions and installations.
Second, MDI ignores interdependencies among facilities that are within the same mission.
As shown in Figure 3.6, intradependency scores do not consider interdependencies among
facility functions within the same mission (shown with solid arrows). Moreover, interde-
pendency scores only consider dependencies between mission layers (shown with dashed
arrows). This oversight may miss the importance of facility functions on each other for
mission assurance after interruptions.
For example, in Figure 3.6, we show that there are relationships between some facility
functions within A-mission Red. Using our network formalism, we can evaluate the conse-
quence of interruption within a mission layer qualitatively by considering the entire set of
interdependency arcs " , rather than only the subset "" . Considering these additional
arcs, we can estimate that the disruption of Facility Function 1, Red does not affect Facility
Function 2, Red. In contrast, disruption of Facility Function 2, Red may impact both Facility
Function 1, Red and Facility Function 3, Red.
Our network formalism also exposes new types of facility functions helpful to understand
the MDI process. For example, we define lone facility functions as facility function nodes
that only support a single mission layer and no other mission or facility function and do
not depend on other facility functions. An example of a lone facility function in Figure 3.6
is Facility Function 4, Red. The existence of these lone facility functions emphasize the
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importance of the intradependency score.Whereas many network measures disregard nodes
that are in the network but have no connectivity (i.e., degree = 0), an installation multilayer
network may depend on these nodes more than others. In fact, an installation may have
a good reason to rank them with higher MDI centrality values than other well-connected
facility functions. An example of this may be an airstrip used for aircraft landing and takeoff.
Another facility function worth highlighting we call a source facility function. We define
a source facility function as a facility function node that is depended on by other facility
functions (either in its own mission layer or a different mission layer), but itself does not
depend on other facility functions. An example of a source facility function in our multilayer
network is A-mission Red, 1. A real-world example of a source facility function may be
large fuel tank located on an installation. The fuel tank is part of an aviation mission and the
tank delivers fuel to several other refueling facilities located across the installation. There is
no facility function at the installation that refills the fuel tank. Thus, at the installation level
the fuel tank appears to be a source facility function. While our example tank may depend
on facilities outside the installation to first fill it, MDI analysis at the scale of an installation
ignore these dependencies that exist across and outside the fence line.
We build on these insights to critique MDI. Overall our network formalism for MDI is
necessarily complicated because the MDI calculation process is not as straightforward as
presented to stakeholders. Without our network representation of MDI, it is difficult for
any SME, mission-owner, or installation commander to understand how their responses
influence facility scores and ranking. We use our multilayer network perspective to develop
simple examples and quantify issues with MDI.
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CHAPTER 4:
Mission Dependency Index: Critique
The MDI calculation process is intended to be easy to follow, but there are many facets in
application that are either subjective or ambiguous. As presented in Ch. 1, there are several
known critiques of MDI already identified by Kujawski and Miller (2009) (see Chapter 1,
Section 1.3). However, there are key issues with MDI that have yet to be addressed that
result from greater investigation of its use and calculation. It is only through examples that
these nuances can be investigated.
4.1 Measuring the Sensitivity of MDI Calculation
As a start, we assess the sensitivity of the MDI equation to MD|, MD1, and # factors.
This requires understanding how the MDI equation (Equation 1.2) works. This equation
is complicated and includes normalization factors and non-linear relationships. MDI was
purposefully designed to normalize MD|, MD0{1 , and # into a single metric from 0 to 100.
Commander, Navy Installations Command (2018) states how the variables, MD|, MD0{1 ,
and # are weighted, where each has a contribution to final MDI score with the following
percentages:




• # = 4%
These percentages can be seen directly from Equation 1.2: MDI scales linearly at approxi-
mately 16 times its MD| value, approximately two times its MD0{1 value, and as 1.65 · ln # .
This leads to our first critique of MDI.
Critique 1: The relative weighting of MD|, MD1, and # means MDI scores are
dominated by subjective interpretation of intradependency, rather than relationships
among facilities to work as networks and support mission.
We build on this understanding of weighting to see how these input variables influenceMDI
categories. Figure 4.1 presents a 3-D scatterplot representing the 256 possible combinations
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of MD| and MD0{1 scores in the case where # = 1. Each combination is colored according
their respective MDI categories. Due to the weighting of MD| in the equation, small
increases in MD| can lead to large changes in MDI category. In contrast, there are only a
few specific MD0{
1
scores that can lead to switching categories. For example, when MD|
is 5.1, there is no MD0{
1
score that would lead to a change in facility MDI category.
Figure 4.1. MDI Response Surface when # = 1. A dotted line extends up to
MD| = 5.1. At at this value, the MDI category of a facility will not change
regardless of its MD0{
1
value.
Figure 4.1 was generated for # = 1. As the value # increases, MDI grows as 1.65 · ln # ,
which tends to be small. For values # = 10 and # = 100, MDI grows by only 3.8 and 7.6
respectively, which could potentially increase the MDI category by one level but is more
likely to have no effect at all.
So theMDI score for a facility is dominated by itsMD| value, which is assigned subjectively
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according to the lookup table in Figure 1.1. Yet, MDI scoring is veiled as being quantitative.
This leads to considerable misinterpretation and misuse.
4.2 Issues with MDI Interpretation and Use
MDI is concerned with rating the overall importance of facilities, with the goal of providing
a prioritized list of the facilities of greatest importance for an installation. MDI scores and
categories are used by individuals tasked with executing funding across an installation. MDI
is particularly important because every mission type is treated equally during analysis and
categorization.
While many DoD services and federal agencies have adopted MDI for these reasons, each
installation and organization varies in the way it employs MDI scores to guide decisions.
For example, NASA uses a three-factor model for facility prioritization (Figure 4.2). In
this framework, NASA uses MDI as a measure both to decide where funds go and to
determine which facilities may qualify for disposal or divestiture. In general, this is a
common interpretation and use of MDI across the DoD, such as in the U.S. Marine Corps
(Renosto 2019).
This use of MDI suggests that answers to Survey Questions 1-4 relate to long-term infras-
tructure planning that involves new construction, recapitalization, and demolition projects.
This perspective does make sense for some responses to Survey Questions 1-4, such as for
facility functions that are impossible to relocate even in the far future. However, Survey
Questions 1-4 also emphasize the impacts of near-term and immediate loss of function,
rather than long-term planning. This suggests that there is another interpretation of MDI
related to its calculation — MDI is the expected near-term impact to mission when a
facility function is lost. This perspective emphasizes how MDI attempts to evaluate the
severity of consequences, which is estimated via IRR measures used in intradependency
and interdependency scores.
With at least two perspectives on MDI— one for long-term planning and one for near-term
impacts— it is unclear what anMDI score represents to a decision-maker. For example, one
facility manager or SMEmight understand a highMDI score as a chance for greater funding,
but another might understand the same score as identifying a facility that is sensitive to
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Figure 4.2. NASA’s use of MDI, adapted from National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (2010). This quad chart evaluates MDI score versus
Asset condition. It adds a third variable, namely cost to repair, represented
by the size of each point.
interruption. In contrast, a facility with a low MDI score could be interpreted as a facility
that does not affect mission when lost, or as a facility that will receive very little funding.
Critique 2: Conflicting long-term and near-termperspectives onMDI create incentives
to give facilities that are less important to mission higher MDI scores.
Since MDI scores are a result of expert elicitation and survey, these conflicting perspectives
create an incentive to assign MDI scores in ways that might undermine its intent. For
example, SMEs may give high MDI scores to facilities that do not have any direct mission
impacts, but rather to those the SME or installation commander wants to maintain or
overhaul. Moreover, the SME my be incentivized to give a low MDI score to facilities that
are deemed unnecessary or unwanted in order to speed up facility disposal, even if some
mission-essential functions might be housed there. Together, these conflicting perspectives
can lead different SMEs on the same installation or across multiple installations to answer
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Survey Questions 1-4 with different intent.
We provide a hypothetical example for how this conflict can occur using our example
calculation from Section 1.1.2, involving the base gymnasium (MDI = 79.38). This MDI
score is in the significant category and is relatively high compared to many other missions.
The reason the gymmay have such a high score is that the SME scoring it decided it requires
an overhaul. The SME justifies this score by saying the fitness mission would be unable to
reestablish mission needs if the facility were shutdown. In an attempt to receive, or qualify
for funding, the SME answers MDI Survey Questions 1 and 2 to maximize the MD| score.
At the same installation, infrastructure that appears more critical to mission needs may
recieve lower scores than the gym. For example, there may also be a potable water mission
that contains a water distribution system. Rather than scoring the water distribution system
based on a need for overhaul, the water mission SME scores Survey Questions 1 and 2
from the perspective of immediate consequence. The potable water mission SME considers
the backup water systems and water storage on base during this calculation. As such, there
is some ability to interrupt and relocate water services if the water distribution system is
disrupted.
In this situation, the gymnasium may receive a higher MDI score than the water distribution
system. The fitness mission SME is incentivized to give an MD| score based on funding,
where thewatermission is incentivized to give a score based onmission consequence.While
physical fitness is very important, a disruption in the gymnasium would probably lead to
staff exercising outside, while the loss of potable water could shut down large portions of
an installation. This hypothetical example can be demonstrated using real data.
Figure 4.3 shows actual MDI scores for a gymnasium and water distribution system —
two facilities taken from the Antelman and Miller (2002). In their work, Antelman and
Miller (2002) use different intradependency and interdependency matrices, leading to dif-
ferent MDI scores, but the impact of differing decision incentives on prioritization occurs
nonetheless. Not only does the water distribution system facility receive a lower MDI score,
it is also in a lower MDI category (relevant). This almost guarantees less funding for the
water distribution system in future decision-making.
The limited effect of MD0{
1
on MDI score is also pronounced in this example. Figure 4.3
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shows that there are 32 dependencies on thewater distribution system, almost three times that
of the dependency on the gymnasium. Furthermore, those facility functions dependent on
the water distribution system have determined that interruption of potable water has greater
consequence their missions, than an interruption to the gymnasium on its interdependent
missions. This is shown by the larger MD0{
1
for the water distribution system of 3.98
compared to the gymnasium MD0{
1
= 2.46.
Figure 4.3. MDI Scores for a Water Distribution System Compared to 
Gymnasium. Adapted from Antelman and Miller (2002).
Critique 3:Conflicting long-termandnear-termperspectives onMDI canmake itmore
difficult to make DoD administrative decisions (e.g., determining the best installation
to locate a new mission).
MDI also creates an opportunity to confuse operational decisions related to missions that
depend on installation infrastructure, but are not housed at a single installation. For example,
in the situation where the USN creates a new class of ship, the ship community manager
will need to select an installation from which to home port. If the community manager was
only given MDI scores for each installation, what should they look for? An installation with
many high MDI scores may mean a higher risk for interruption to mission, yet that higher
risk equates to better funding and thus better facilities. Likewise, an installation with low
MDI scores may mean stability in operational support, but less funding for upkeep and the
potential for some services to be divested in the near future.
A similar hypothetical situation occurs when a USN Captain is choosing which of two new
bases he/she wants to take command of next. Here, the Captain may prefer an installation
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where MDI scores are predominately high, indicating higher risk and greater consequences
to mission sets, but with greater budget and more attention by their service community.
Whereas an installation with mostly low MDI scores would appear more stable with less
risk, thus receiving less funding and attention when problems arise.
Onemight also conclude that the bestMDI scores for an installation should lie somewhere in
between the two extremes. For example, imagine an installation that balanced allMDI scores
such that each facility had a score near some mean value (e.g., MDI= 50). This balancing
prevents adversaries from identifying critical facilities as targets and may deter an attack
on the installation. Yet, this balance would also make it difficult to manage funds. Similar
to deterring an attacker, an installation with balanced scores does not help decision-makers
prioritize which facilities need funding.
Overall, these hypothetical examples demonstrate the true difficulty of the MDI process: the
ultimate use of MDI does not necessarily relate to its interpretation. MDI Survey Questions
1-4, IRR responses, and intradependency and interdependency scores can be interpreted in
at least two ways. This makes it difficult to know howMDI scores were assigned within and
among installations. This also creates situations where using MDI to guide decisions may
only complicate the decision-making process.
4.3 Issues with MDI Calculation
Even if all facility SMEs and decision-makers across the DoD were able to agree on
MDI interpretation and use, there are inherent issues with measuring intradependency
and interdependency scores that may lead to ineffective ranking and prioritization with
MDI. For example, past studies critiquing MDI suggest that the use of risk matrices for
calculating MD| and MD1 may be ineffective for asset prioritization (see Kujawski and
Miller 2009). In addition to these known issues, we identify additional issues that derive
from MDI calculation generating a multilayer network of military missions and facility
functions without being explicit about this process.
Specifically, assessing intradependency for a mission essentially means generating a net-
work that links mission needs to facility functions. Then, when assessing interdependency,
a second network is generated linking facilities across missions. This two-step process
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has at least three problems that lead to significant sources of error among missions and
installations:
• The Mission Partitioning Problem: The number of missions at an installation has a
direct impact on the MDI score for all facilities at the installation.
• The Interdependency Assignment Problem: There are multiple ways to assign
dependencies across facilities and missions, where methods that assign more depen-
dencies lead to increased MDI scores over methods that assign fewer dependencies.
• The Replaceability Problem: Replaceability is only measured for a single facility-
facility dependency that is currently in use (one-to-one, static). However, replaceabil-
ity involves multiple interactions representing where a facility may access services
when functions are disrupted (one-to-many, dynamic).
We consider each of these in additional detail.
4.3.1 The Mission Partitioning Problem
As described above, MDI scores do not consider interdependencies among facilities within
the same mission. Instead, the the only way to include facility-to-facility dependencies is
when these facilities are managed by different missions. Using our notation from Chapter 3,
MDI only considers arcs (8, 9) ∈ "
"
⊆ " . This leads to what we term a mission
partitioning problem, where increasing the number of missions on an installation may
increase the number of the interdependencies used for MDI calculation. Specifically, the
more missions on the installation, the more likely that interdependencies within a mission
become interdependencies across missions and are included in MDI calculation (i.e., the
more likely an arc (8, 9) changes from (8, 9) ∉ "
"
to (8, 9) ∈ "
"
). The extreme
situation would be each facility function is its own mission, which would consider all
interdependencies in MDI calculation (i.e., "
"
= ").
We motivate the mission partitioning problem with a hypothetical, but realistic example.
Consider a Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM) mission that is comprised of seven separate facilities
(Figure 4.4). The DFM mission is established to provide fuel to ships at a pier. There are
two storage tanks that house the fuel, a pumping station that flows fuel from the tanks to
the pier pumps, three fuel pumps that service separate locations at a pier, and one motor
control center that controls all pump speeds and fuel flow rates.
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Figure 4.4. Example Diesel Fuel Marine Mission. The DFM mission is com-
prised of seven facilities. Each facility function is dependent on each other
to function (shown with blue arrows). MD| and MD1 values for all facility
functions are the same.
For simplicity, let us assume that every facility function within the DFM mission is de-
pendent on every other facility (i.e., dependencies within the DFM mission form a fully
connected network). Figure 4.4 illustrates how this would look for the seven facilities and
their functional dependencies within the DFM mission. Here, the blue arrows represent the
dependence of one facility function on another facility function.
We also assume that each facility function within the DFM mission is assigned the same
MD| and MD1 scores. Figure 4.4 sets every MD| score to 4.67, which equates to MDI
Survey Questions 1 and 2 responses as short and impossible, respectively. Likewise, every
MD1 score is 2.6, which results from responses to Survey Questions 3 and 4 as prolonged
and difficult, respectively.
Grouping all facilities into the DFM mission affects their final MDI scores. We refer to
this situation as all seven facilities being assigned into the same mission layer. Here, only
MD| scores are used for MDI calculation. Even though the facility functions in Figure 4.4
have dependency amongst themselves (shown in blue), they are not considered because all
facilities support the DFM mission. Since all facility functions have the same MD| scores,
all facilities have the same MDI. Specifically, each facility function in the DFMmission has
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an MDI = 65.55 (Relevant).
An important questions is: what would happen if the DFM facilities were partitioned
into separate missions, and what happens when the same facilities and dependencies are
spread across more missions? Figure 4.5 shows several ways to partition the DFM into
two missions "1 and "2 that are reasonable to capture some of the sub-mission functions
and their relationships. For example, an installation commander may separate the controls
system from the DFM mission if its primarily operated by the utility mission (%1). The
tanks may be considered their own mission related to storage and emergency management
(%2). The pumping station may be combined with the tanks as the storage and pumping
mission (%3). The control system can be included with the storage and pumping mission to
consider the docking and pier infrastructure as its own mission (%4).
Although each grouping of facilities and missions across Figures 4.4 and 4.5 appears rea-
sonable, the choice of chosen partitioning changes the MDI scores and categories assigned
to each facility function. When the DFM mission is partitioned into "1 and "2, the blue
arcs representing dependencies are now included in MDI calculation as interdependencies.
Only blue arcs that cross these partitions are included in calculation (intradependencies
are still ignored). This can have drastic effect on results even when MD| and MD1 do not
change.
Table 4.1 presents the MDI scores and categories for DFM facilities given different mission
partitions. Partition %0 represents the original DFM mission where all facilities are in "2.
We can see that once the DFM mission is partitioned into two sub-missions, all facilities
receive a higher MDI score than the %0 instance. Additionally, facility functions that lie
within the smaller sub-mission group have higher MDI scores than those in the larger sub-
mission group. For example, in Partition %3, the facilities in "1 receive a higher score than
those in "2 since there are only 3 facilities in "1 and 4 facilities in "2. The MDI scores
for these facilities are exchanged once "1 becomes the larger mission partition.
While more mission partitions automatically raise MDI scores, the most important effect
is on MDI categories. Given the MD| and MD1 scores for the DFM mission, facilities in
each mission partition are assigned different MDI categories. For example, in Partition %1
the controls mission ("1) is placed in the MDI category significant, where the rest of the
DFM mission remains in the category relevant. Simply by setting a sub-mission partition,
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Figure 4.5. Partitioning Possibilities of the Diesel Fuel Marine Mission. The
two new sub-mission types are "1 (green) and "2 (purple). There are four
different partition patterns represented by %1−%4. Notice that some arrows
that represent facility function dependencies now connect across missions,
which means they now constitute an interdependencies according to MDI
calculation. Only these interdependency arrows are used for MDI calculation.
one can both raise MDI scores and change their categories used for decision-making.
This realistic example shows that the number of mission partitions on an installation affects
the MDI score of all facilities on an installation. If each facility function was part of one
big installation mission, they would only be ranked by MD| scores, which minimizes each
facility’s possibleMDI score and category. In contrast, if each facility function was assigned
its own mission, it would maximize each facility’s MDI score and category by including as
many MD1 interactions as possible (Max #).
Taking this concept of partitioning to the extreme, imagine if every facility function was
its own mission. In this situation, every facility-facility interaction is an interdependency.
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Table 4.1. Effect of Mission Partitioning on MDI. Partition %0 is the base
case presented in Figure 4.4. Partitions %1 − %4 are from Figure 4.5. |"1|
and |"2| refers to the number of facility functions in each mission. The last
two columns are the MDI scores for each facility function within the given
partition. Color relates to MDI category, where yellow represents relevant
and orange represents significant (rounded up).
Partition |"1| |"2| "1 MDI "2 MDI
%0 0 7 n/a 65.55
%1 1 6 69.8 66.9
%2 2 5 69.3 68.0
%3 3 4 69.2 68.7
%4 4 3 68.7 69.2
This removes the partitioning problem, but maximizes MDI scores. Figure 4.6 depicts this
representation for the DFMmission. In this example, every facility increases their respective
MDI score from 65.55 to 69.2 and their category from relevant to significant.
Figure 4.6. Full partitioning of the Diesel Fuel Marine Mission. The facility’s
color is not an attributing any mission type, but rather to show the facilities
edge. Each black circle would represent each facility’s unique mission type.
Notice that now every arrow that represents dependency is cut by the black
unique mission circles.
Critique 4: The existence of the mission partitioning problem enables misuse by al-
lowing the arbitrary choice of the number of missions and facility functions at an
installation to change all facility MDI scores.
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The existence of the mission partitioning problem can lead to shifts in MDI scores as
missions are assigned to an installation. Knowing this enables misuse of MDI within the
U.S. government. For example, a SME, base commander, or manager who decides mission
partitions can choose partitions that best suit their funding needs. For example, a base
commander within the USN trying to receive additional funding for infrastructure would
want to increase the number of mission partitions on their installation. Within the DoD, it
is unknown how missions and facilities are partitioned in this way.
The ability to “game” the scoring system in this way is not as bad as it gets, in the sense that
gaming the system means that its users understand its rules and can make use of them to
achieve some subjective desired outcome. Given the convoluted and obscure nature of the
MDI scoring system, a more likely scenario is that users are following it blindly, unaware
how their arbitrary but well-intended decisions about mission partitioning are artificially
influencing the outcome of their analysis.
4.3.2 The Interdependency Assignment Problem
The initial determination of interactions between facility functions, termed here the interde-
pendency assignment problem, has its own issues. The MDI process considers interdepen-
dencies based on answers to Survey Questions 3 and 4. However, there are multiple ways a
SME may answer these questions, which in turn can change the number of interdependen-
cies considered in final calculation. In other words, the number of interdependencies among
facility functions, |" |, is a function of SME interpretation. As explained above, situations
where more interdependencies are considered tend to lead to higher MDI scores.
Again, we motivate this problem with a hypothetical, but realistic scenario. Recall that there
are both administrative A-missions, and operational O-missions. Consider an O-mission
answering Survey Questions 3 and 4 for the example DFM mission defined in Figure 4.4
(e.g., a ship that needs fuel). Figure 4.7 shows that interdependency assigned from the O-
mission to the DFMmission can occur in at least two different ways. The first methodwe call
blanket assignment, where the a facility function (e.g., ship) attributes its interdependency
to every facility function in the DFMmission. The secondmethod we call direct assignment,
where a facility function attributes its interdependency to only a single facility function that
it directly depends on (e.g., fuel pump on pier). Whereas blanket assignment assumes each
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facility function within the DFM mission supports refueling, direct assignment assumes
interdependency only matters for the facility that actually provides the desired service or
commodity.
Figure 4.7. While not solely specific to only O-missions, blanket assignment is
when an interdependent O-mission or a facility function from another mission
type attributes its dependency to every facility function within the interde-
pendent mission type. In contrast to blanket assignment, direct assignment
only assigns interdependency to those facility functions which directly provide
service or commodity.
To emphasize the interdependency problem, we present real examples of using both blanket
and direct assignment. Figure 4.8 presents a situation where blanket assignment was used
to determine MDI scores for an fuel-aviation mission. This example is from the MDI
validation report of Antelman andMiller (2002), adapted to emphasize the interdependency
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assignment problem. Here, the report shows all facility functions within the fuel-aviation
mission. On the far right is the column labelled # , which is the number of facility functions
fromothermissions that report interdependency on the fuel-aviationmission. In this scoring,
almost every facility function has an # reported as seven.
Figure 4.8. Blanket assignment interdependency excerpt taken from Antel-
man and Miller (2002). Depicts the Fuel-Aviation and a number of its asso-
ciated facility functions. On the right hand side is the MD1 average and #
value for each one of the facility functions. In all but one case both values
are exactly the same.
Upon further analysis, we find that these # values are a result of blanket assignment. Fig-
ure 4.9 presents an example of where these interdependency scores are originate from.
Specifically, “POL PIPELIN” (a facility in the fuel-aviation mission) is scored by missions
“AIMD Mayport”, “NAVAIRDEPOT JACKSONVILLE FL”, and “NAVSTA MAYPORT
FL - Supply.” We find each of these mission’s facility functions reported their interdepen-
dency the same way for every facility within the fuel-aviation mission type (i.e., blanket
assignment). This is not a stand alone result. Within Antelman and Miller (2002) and
other reports showing MDI calculation, many facility functions used blanket assignment to
determine MD1 scores.
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Figure 4.9. Interdependency reporting taken from Antelman and Miller
(2002).This image highlights the facility function “POL PIPELINE” from
the Fuel-Aviation mission. It also highlights the other missions that assign
interdependency to the “POL PIPELINE” function.
In contrast, Figure 4.10 shows facility functions that belong within the electrical mission
with MD1 scores that result from direct assignment. The column to the far right, # ,
shows a different number of interdependent facilities for every single facility function
within the electrical mission. In fact the “Step-Down Transformer” listed at the bottom has
no interdependencies. The MDI values for the electrical mission are are result of direct
assignment.
Figure 4.10. Direct assignment interdependency excerpt taken from Antel-
man and Miller (2002). The electrical mission is highlighted at the top. To
the right the MD1 average and # values are highlighted. Notice that none
of these values are the same per facility function
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Critique 5: The interdependency assignment problem enablesmisuse as the best choice
of how to assign interdependencies among facility functions is unclear, and methods
that increase the number of interdependencies will raise MDI scores.
These inconsistencies in attributing interdependency lead to unfairMDI comparisons, which
in turn will lead to ill-advised funding decisions. Facility functions that are scored based
on blanket interdependency assignment will receive higher MDI scores on average than
those using direct assignment. In turn, more funding will be directed to blanket assign-
ment missions than those with facility functions using direct interdependency assignment.
It is important to emphasize that the interdependency problem occurs across all missions
considered in MDI calculation. We present our example using an O-mission to simplify
explanation. The effect of the interdependency assignment problem becomes more pro-
nounced and difficult to measure when missions with multiple facilities and MDI scores are
related to each other.
The interdependency assignment problem also leads to other unintended consequences. In
particular, it artificially raises scores for missions housed within the same building.
Figure 4.11 shows how two different missions may share the same building. Here facility
number 0002 is shared by both the “DESRON 24” mission and the “NAVSTA MAYPORT
FL - HARBOR OPS” mission. As previously discussed, we have one facility that co-
locates two functions. Other missions that depend on destroyer squadron 24 and harbor ops
only select facility number 0002 when answering Survey Questions 3 and 4, rather than
specifying which facility function they are dependent on. As a a result, these two distinct
facility functions receive the same # values and MD1 scores, despite serving different
missions.
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Figure 4.11. Shared facility between two functions of different missions ex-
cerpt taken from Antelman and Miller (2002). Highlighted in blue is the
facility number, 0002. Highlighted in red are the two different functions that
reside in that facility. Highlighted on the right are the MD1 average and
# values. We see that both functions share the facility benefit from the
interdependencies of the other.
This form of assignment means the more facility functions that are housed in the same
facility, the greater chance of receiving funding (similar to themission partitioning problem).
This self-referential issue is shown in Figure 4.12. Here, facility number A-2 is a berth which
is owned by the harbor ops mission. This berth also houses a water hook-up that is owned
by the water distribution mission. The “Berth” then reports its mission is interdependent on
the water distribution mission located at the same facility. Thus, it could be interpreted that
the harbor ops mission facility is interdependent on itself, creating an unfair representation
of dependence that would lead to increased MDI scores.
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Figure 4.12. Shared facility between two functions of different missions with
interdependency between the functions excerpt taken from Antelman and
Miller (2002). Highlighted at the top is a mission Harbor Ops. The same
mission is highlighted again in the other mission interdependency section.
This is caused because the potable water mission has a water hook up that
shares the facility A-2, creating what appears to be a facility function de-
pending on itself.
4.3.3 The Replaceability Problem
The assignment problems exist due to the networks formed during MDI calculation. In
both cases, MDI calculation assumes a static network structure underlying mission-facility
and facility-facility dependencies. However, many aspects of IRR factors relate to network
dynamics that should include network reconfiguration. Notwithstanding issues with repre-
senting interruptability and relocatability with a static network, we focus attention on how
a static network representation fails to capture the effects of replaceability.
There are many instances where redundancies and alternate sources of facility function are
built into real systems. An example may be the three piers in our DFM example, where a
ship can refuel at any one pier and the other two act as redundant backups. Using a network
representation, we may consider these additional sources of facility function as arcs that
exist but are not necessarily active (Figure4.13).
Figure 4.13 shows an O-mission facility function who is dependent on the DFM mission
and could attribute interdependency to three different pier fuel pump functions. Currently,
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neither intradependency nor interdependency considers these arcs associated with replace-
ability and MDI lacks the capability to evaluate circumstances when the O-mission facility
function switches between facilities. In many cases, facilities that are installed as redundan-
cies or backups will have lowerMDI scores than their “in use” counterpart. These redundant
facility functions receive less funding and may be threatened by disposal and divestiture.
Figure 4.13. Replaceability and Redundancy in the Diesel Fuel Marine Mis-
sion. We assume an O-mission that needs a pier to function. Normally, MDI
only considers the pier the O-mission facility function is located at via direct
assignment. However, the O-mission facility function can receive refueling
functions at any pier connected by yellow arcs. These represent possible as-
signments and replaceability of function. Should any of the three pier fuel
pumps become interrupted there are two other possible facility functions that
can be used instead. MDI does not consider these functional replacements
in calculation.
MDI Survey Questions 1-4 consider only how difficult it is to replace a facility function,
not where the new function would be acquired. Thus, MDI scoring may lead one to believe
that the loss of any facility function would eventually interrupt a mission need as a whole.
This is unrealistic and introduces additional issues when considering how MDI calculation
changes over time.
Critique 6: The replaceability problem enables misuse as interdependencies to backup
facilities and redundant functions meant to enable mission assurance are not consid-
ered in MDI calculation.
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Compare Figures 4.13 with Figure 4.14. Given current MDI calculation in Figure 4.13, if
there is only a single O-mission facility function, a single pier may receive a higher MDI
score (assuming direct assignment). Moreover, the answer to MDI Survey Question 4 would
suggest easy functional replacement. If at a later time there were ships located at each pier
(Figure 4.14) the vulnerability of the new system would not be considered in MDI scores.
Here, each pier has a ship, and each pier should have a higher MDI score. There is also no
additional capacity for functional replacement, leading to higher MD1 scores overall.
Figure 4.14. Functional Replaceability Given More O-mission facility func-
tions. When all piers have O-mission facility functions assigned to them,
there is no capacity for the DFM mission to replace the fuel pump functions.
Each pier will have a higher MD1 score than in Figure 4.13 as each pier has
an O-mission facility function and functional replaceability is more difficult.
Overall, there is no effectiveway to consider facilities that perform similar or interchangeable
functions without considering network dynamics. In one situation, where the O-mission
facility function moving from one pier to another should lower the score of the original
pier, and raise the MDI of the new pier. In another situation, when the number of O-mission
facility functions on an installation changes, MDI should be reassessed as the availability
and difficulty of functional replacement will also change.
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4.4 Summary
This chapter takes a deep dive into the application and nuances of MDI. We present an
in-depth explanation of MDI calculation not previously found in the literature. In doing so,
we expose several new issues with MDI interpretation and calculation.
Issues with MDI interpretation and use stem from conflicting perspectives on long-term
infrastructure funding decisions with perspectives on near-term consequences of infrastruc-
ture failure. This may lead a SME to answer the same MDI questions differently based on
perspective. This leads to inconsistent and possibly erroneous results, such as a gymnasium
receiving a higher MDI score and category than a water distribution system.
One way to overcome this issue is to include weighting across missions. MDI is mission
agnostic and assumes that everymission is equal.While the issues associatedwith conflicting
funding and operational incentivesmay never go away, weighing the scores of onemission to
another could help alleviate issues with inflated MD| scores. In the case of the gymnasium
versus the water distribution system, if there existed a way to weight the utility mission
as more important than the fitness mission based on the goals of the installation, more
appropriate ranking for funding prioritization would occur.
We recommend developing an internally consistent manner for installation commanders to
rank and weight missions on their installation. One way to do this is with multi-criteria
decision analysis (Kiker et al. 2005). This weighting should be included directly in the
MDI score calculation and categorization of facilities (Commander, Navy Installations
Command 2018). These weightings should also consider the needs of both SMEs, and
high-level decision-makers within each service. Achieving this would require developing a
way to survey and generate consensus among SME within each DoD service.
To manage the mission partitioning problem, the interdependency assignment problem, and
the replaceability problem, MDI methods need to change. We develop a new network-based
model for MDI in an attempt to overcome these issues.
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CHAPTER 5:
An Improved Network Model for MDI
We build on our multilayer network model and critique of MDI to develop new methods
for measuring mission dependency across facilities. Our new methods start by considering
MDI via a network flow model. Specifically, we develop a flow network model for a single
mission layer and assess how disruptions to facility functions impact MDI scores.
5.1 Mission Network Flow Model
We choose to develop our improved model for MDI using network flow methods for several
important reasons. First, as shown in our literature review in Chapter 2, network flow
models have been extensively used for network vulnerability analysis formany infrastructure
missions assessed byMDI. They also easily build upon our infrastructuremultilayer network
formalismpresented in Section 3.2, by settingmodeling restrictions for single-layer networks
(Alderson et al. 2015) and interdependent networks (Enayaty Ahangar et al. 2020). Thus,
we can relate the function of a flow network to an installation multilayer network for MDI
calculation.
5.1.1 A Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM) Mission Network
We start with a sample flow network introduced by Alderson et al. (2015) and presented
in Figure 5.1. For our purposes, this network model represents a DFM mission at the scale
of a military installation. It is comprised of 16 facility function nodes. Nodes n08 and n10
represent source facility functions which supply diesel fuel to the rest of DFM mission.
Source nodes are assumed to have a supply of 10 units of fuel (i.e., the commodity) such
that neither source node has enough commodity to support the entire network. Thus, it is
important that those source nodes remain functional. The rest of the nodes are distribution
and demand nodes. All nodes are connected by edges representing pipes that can support
fuel flow in either direction. Nodes n03, n04, and n16 are linked to the network with parallel,
redundant pipes to ensure reliable delivery of fuel even after a network disruption of any
single pipe. In other words, there would need to be two simultaneous pipe breaks to sever
the linkage. The sample flow network assumes 1 cost unit per item of flow across any arc.
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The penalty to cross a damaged arc and the penalty for not getting enough resources to an
arc are both assumed to be 10 cost units. The overall objective is to minimize the cost to
flow fuel over a pipeline connecting source facility functions to facility functions that either
deliver and/or demand fuel, including any penalties for non-delivery. Mathematical details
of the underlying optimization model are available in the Appendix.
Figure 5.1. Diesel Fuel Marine Network Model. We adapt a fuel network
model from Alderson et al. (2015) as the start to our mission network model.
Below each node is the supply of fuel currently stored at the facility (3= > 0)
or the demand the node requires to continue functioning (3= < 0). The DFM
network has two source facility functions (black outlines) and 14 distribution
and demand facility functions (white outlines). Blue color indicates the node
is functioning properly and does not have unmet demand, whereas nodes
that are colored green are in demand of fuel and/or are interrupted. All arcs
(yellow) represent pipes and are modeled as bidirectional edges until our
mission network flow problem is solved.
Figure 5.1 was recreated using the Plotly library (Plotly Technologies Inc. 2015) in the
Python ProgrammingLanguage (VanRossumandDrake Jr 1995). Source nodes n08 and n10
are denoted with an outer black ring while the other nodes have a white ring. Additionally,
nodes that have a supply of commodity greater than or equal to zero will be blue on the
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interior. Thiswould indicate that the node has the resources necessary to perform its function.
Nodes with green centers have supplies less than zero and are considered interrupted, thus
and not able to perform its function. The supply levels for each node are annotated below
each node.
This network flow problem has been well-studied in the literature (Alderson et al. 2015;
Ruether 2015; Barrow III 2019; Flinn 2020; Kuc 2020), and our implementation uses
the same problem data and assumptions as previous studies. Building on the literature,
we provide a model description using terminology developed for installation multilayer
networks to explain how this problem formulation relates to MDI.
All facility function nodes are able to reroute and deliver fuel from source facilities to
other facilities, similar to pumping stations and control facilities in a pipeline. As a result,
each facility function node can be interdependent on each adjacent facility depending on
commodity flow direction. Given sources, demands, and possible flow paths over edges,
solving the network flow problem minimizes the cost to move commodities from sources to
demands and determines flow direction. The resulting minimum cost solution determines
the directionality of network interdependencies.
We solve the optimization problem detailed in the Appendix to determine the minimum cost
flow of fuel over this DFMmission.We use the Pyomo optimization library (Hart et al. 2011)
to represent the mathematics in a laptop computer and use the CPLEX solver (IBM 2017)
to obtain the solution, which represents a steady state snapshot of fuel flows and network
interdependencies. Figure 5.2 presents the resulting solution in terms of the quantity of
commodity and direction of flow across the arcs of the network given the minimum cost
objective value and no network disruptions.
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Figure 5.2. Diesel Fuel Marine Network with Flows. Green arcs show the flow
of fuel over the DFM network to achieve the minimum cost for a network
operator using our mission network flow problem. The quantity of fuel moved
across each arc is shown beside each arc. All the nodes are now blue indicating
that every node received enough fuel to function properly. The cost to the
operator to solve the system is 25 units.
5.1.2 Realistic Mission Network Model
To use our network flow problem for mission dependency analysis, we need to define a
mission network model. Considering our realistic DFM network, we apply MDI scoring
methods presented in Chapter 1 and several additional model assumptions.
Model Assumptions for MDI
We make several assumptions about the MDI survey and calculation process that are
intended to overcome flaws identified in Chapter 3.
First, we assume that all interdependencies within a mission are known. Our network
flow problem is only for a single network layer and models interdependencies among
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facility functions as edges and arcs. The MDI survey process does not consider these
interdependencies within a mission layer in normal calculation. We assume that the mission
owner or SME who answer questions for an MDI survey knows these interdependencies
prior to analysis. This assumption is reasonable for the DFM mission and similar missions
as SMEs would know the connectivity and operation of their facility functions and the
direction and use of their commodity flows. This assumption overcomes aspects of the
Mission Partitioning Problem by including all arcs within a mission layer in analysis.
We also assume that possible interdependencies within a mission are known. Possible
interdependencies are modeled in our network flow problem as edges instead of directed
arcs. This is done to identify flows and interdependencies as an output from identifying
an optimal flow solution. This assumes that the location facility functions would relocate
to or be replaced from are predefined given a disruption to the mission network. This
assumption is also reasonable as this knowledge is known by SMEs, especially those
involved in continuity of operations planning. This assumption overcomes aspects of the
Interdependency Assignment Problem by assuming direct assignment, but allowing for
multiple possible assignments prior to model solve.
We assume thatMD0{
1
scores for facility functions are assigned after a network flowproblem
is solved. Accordingly, we assume all MD1 scores for arcs are assigned prior to knowing
the facility that is providing the interdependent function. MD1 scores are the output of
answering MDI Survey Questions 3 and 4. Normally this is done for the facility already
providing the required function. However, we assume that Survey Questions 3 and 4 can
be answered for the function, rather than the facility. For example, a SME can determine
how interruptable and replaceable pumping and re-routing of fuel flows is within the DFM
without knowing where the fuel is coming from. We assume SMEs are capable to answer
MDI survey questions in this way. The assumption overcomes aspects of the Relocatability
Problem by allowing for functional relocation via network edges.
MDI Scores for the Diesel Fuel Marine Mission
We develop notional MDI scores for our sample DFMmission network. Although our DFM
mission network is a recreation of the network developed in (Alderson et al. 2015), this
network has never had MD|, MD1, and # values assigned to it. Following our network flow
assumptions, prior to solving our flow problem, we assign MD| only to nodes and MD1
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to possible arcs. We generate these scores by creating notional responses to MDI survey
questions.
Table 5.1 presents hypothetical MDI survey responses for each node in the DFM mission.
From these responses that the mission network flow model can evaluate each node’s MD|,
MD1, and # values from Equation 1.2. The attribution of MD1 and # values are directly
associated with how the sample flow network moves material through the network. This
provides the basis for how the mission network flow model interprets interdependencies.
Table 5.1. Example MDI Survey Responses for Diesel Fuel Marine Mission
Network.
node Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
n01 P P P P
n02 P D P D
n03 N I B X
n04 N I N I
n05 S P P P
n06 S D S X
n07 S X S D
n08 S D P D
n09 S D P D
n10 S D P D
n11 B P S D
n12 S X S X
n13 S X S D
n14 B X B X
n15 B X B X
n16 N I N I
Note: Q1 and Q3 Responses: N: None; B: Brief; S: Short; P: Prolonged.
Q2 and Q4 Responses: I: Impossible, X: Extremely Difficult; D: Difficult; P:
Possible. See Section 1.1.1 for more detail.
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We use the values from Table 5.1 to compute the MD| value for each node in the DFM
network.We use the direction of fuel flow in the DFMnetwork to identify interdependencies
between nodes. This allows for attribution of interdependency and assignment of MD1
scores, which are calculated from responses in Table 5.1 interpreted through Figures 1.1
and 1.2. We count the number of dependencies each node has in terms of the number of
arcs originating from a node and use it as that node’s # value. The mission network flow
model will then calculatesMD0{
1
for each node as determined by the number ofMD1 values
attributed to that node. Thus, this assignment allows us to calculate # for each node as the
out-degree of interdependency arcs.
Figure 5.3 illustrates the mapping between the original DFM pipeline network and a cor-
responding mission network annotated with MDI calculations. Figure 5.3A repeats the
optimal minimum-cost flows from Figure 5.2 for ease of comparison. Figure 5.3B shows
the resulting mission network, which requires some explanation.
Each node in Figure 5.3B is annotated with all threeMDI variables used as input to calculate
the overall MDI score for the entire system using Equation 1.2. The MDI scores for each
facility function are shown centered on top of each node. On the top of Figure 5.3B the
average MDI value and the sum of all MDI values also shown.
We observe that this calculation of MDI from a relatively simple fuel network is neither
transparent or intuitive. It is not apparent how the survey responses in Table 5.1 affect the
MDI scores or how the operational resilience of the original fuel network is captured, if at
all, in MDI scores.
We explore this in additional detail by considering the way this mission network can be
used to inform vulnerability assessment.
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Figure 5.3. Mission Network Flow Model at Steady State. Panel B represents
the mission network flow model at steady state. MD| values are displayed
below the nodes, MD1 values are center point on the orange arcs, and the
node’s MDI score is depicted on top of the node. The sum of all the MDI
scores in the network is annotated at the top. Panel A represents the un-
derlying Diesel Fuel Marine network that, once in steady state, provides the
basis for how dependence is established in Panel B. Therefore, Panel B is
conditional on the outcome of Panel A. It is important to note that only the
location and direction of arcs is transferred from Panel A to Panel B. No
other information is required to generate Panel B from Panel A. For instance,
the flow volume shown over arcs in Panel A has no correlation to the MD1
values shown by arcs in Panel B.
5.2 Mission Vulnerability based on Network Function
With the network and synthetic MDI scores, we can calculate MDI for a single set of
survey responses. Two key measures for a single network realization are the flow cost (via
the objective value of the underlying optimization problem), representing the difficulty of
completing the DFM mission, and the sum of the MDI scores across facilities, representing
the amount of mission essential facilities in the mission. When disruptions lead to changes
in flow direction and active interdependencies, we can then use these new results to calculate
a new flow costs and a new MDI for each facility function. How these measures relate to
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each other provides a glimpse at the relationship between relocatability and replaceability
and MDI.
Accordingly, we can couple our mission network flow model with different vulnerability
analysis methods to assess this cost-mission relationship. The literature on network vulner-
ability has many methods for guiding the analysis of many different failure scenarios. In
particular, there are at least two ways to consider vulnerability of flow networks with the
goal of maximizing the cost to operate the mission: worst-case and exhaustive enumeration.
Worst-case vulnerability utilizes an additional game theoretic model to determine the single
worst-case failure of edges or nodes that interdict network flows, maximizing the minimum
cost objective value. Exhaustive enumeration studies every single combination of failures
to determine each of their effects. Due to the relatively small size of our model, we use
exhaustive enumeration to study the cost-mission relationship in the DFM mission.
5.2.1 Mission Vulnerability via Edge Interdictions
We assess mission vulnerability via edge interdictions on the original DFM network. We
start with one interdiction, that is to say that the simulated scenario involves the loss of flow
over a single pipeline in the DFM mission. Figure 5.4B presents an example of a single
edge interdiction for the worst-case failure of an edge from a network function perspective.
Interdiction of edge (n10, n13) raises the flow cost of the objective value more than any other
single edge interdiction. We interpret this as worst-case for relocatability and replacement
of facility functions. However, it is unclear if this causes the greatest interruption to mission
facility functions. We estimate interruption to facility functions via the summation of MDI
scores for each active node in the mission network after interdiction. Thus, it is necessary
to compare flow cost to the sum of MDI scores remaining in the mission.
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Figure 5.4. Worst-case One Edge Interdiction. The edge between n10 and
n13 is the single worst-case failure of a pipe based on the literature (Alderson
et al. 2015), as it raises the network flow cost the most as shown in Panel A.
In Panel B, the mission network flow model is conditional on how flow was
rerouted in Panel A. The interdiction of this edge may lead to the greatest
disruption to cost in Panel A, it does not lead to the greatest disruption
to Panel B. However, this network disruption may not lead to the greatest
interruption to sum of MDI facility function in Panel B
We now consider an experiment to assess systematically the relationship between system
operation (i.e., cost of rerouting fuel) and the associated MDI scores. We repeat the calcu-
lation explained in Figure 5.4 for every possible break of a single pipe segment. For each
simulated pipe break, we compute the resulting operating cost (after fuel flow has been
rerouted) and the resulting MDI calculation for the corresponding mission network.
The scatterplot in Figure 5.5 displays the results for this experiment. The vertical axis shows
the overall system operating cost when flows have been rerouted after a pipe break (as in
Figure 5.4A). The horizontal axis shows the aggregate MDI score across all nodes in the
corresponding mission network (as in Figure 5.4B). In this figure, each point represents the
combination of operating cost and MDI aggregate score for each possible single pipe break.
The original network (no breaks) has a low cost and low MDI score, as indicated by the
green marker. The worst-case single pipe break (from Figure 5.4) has the highest possible
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operating cost and also the highest aggregate MDI score.
Figure 5.5. Comparison of Flow Cost vs. MDI for Single Edge Interdiction.
Each point in this figure represents the operating cost from the underlying
fuel network and the aggregate MDI score for facility functions in the cor-
responding DFM mission. The green marker in the bottom left is for the
original DFM mission (no interdictions) and the red points are for all single
edge interdictions. The point labeled Fig. 5.4 represents the worst-case single
edge interdiction shown in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.5 is subdivided into four quadrants for readability. On the MDI Score axis, network
flow solutions in the HIGH region have more critical facility functions online. In general,
we find these network states to be less interrupted. However, they also tend to have high
volatility and greater risks to missions, especially if value is greater than our network flow
solution without interdictions (green marker). In contrast, network flow solutions in the
LOW MDI region represent situations where many facilities may be interrupted and/or are
stable to further interruption.
Figure 5.5 helps to explain whether a high cost of functional relocation and replacement
corresponds to a large interruption of facilities. In particular, we find many single pipe
break situations to cost more and therefore require functional relocation and replacement,
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but few single pipe break situations to result in significant drop in facility MDI scores. In
fact, many single edge interdictions only raise the MDI scores for DFM facility functions,
rather than reduce or interrupt them. This is emphasized with the worst-case interdiction
result from Figure 5.4 labelled in Figure 5.5. Here, the worst-case situation for relocatability
and replaceability leads to the greatest increase in overall MDI score.
The observed increase in MDI is the result of a change in flow that leads to a change in how
"1 values are attributed across the network. The interdiction of edge (n10, n13) leads to
facility functions n09 and n13 MDI values dropping due flow redistribution. However, the
MDI scores of facility functions n01, n14, and n15 increase. The overall decrease is smaller
than overall increase, and thus we see that total MDI has increased. Overall, the system has
become more critical from an MDI perspective, even though nothing has been interrupted.
Our analysis for a single edge interdiction suggests that having redundancy in a network can
have an effect on the interpretation of MDI values. Specifically, including redundancies in
initial MDI calculation can reduce facility function scores. When redundancies are removed
(or interdicted), facilities may receive higher MDI scores by becoming more critical. This
simple result has many implications for MDI survey and calculation. Namely, a facility that
receives a high MDI score, may appear extremely vital, but may easily be routed around
after disruption. And if MDI is used as a tool to used to allocate limited resources, then a
facility with a high MDI score that has redundancy would receive funding when it may not
as critical as it appears.
Figure 5.6A presents the worst-case interdiction of two edges based on flow cost from
Alderson et al. (2015). In this case, the corresponding mission network in Figure 5.6B
reveals many facility functions are removed from the network, suggesting a large impact
on network MDI score. Although this is the worst interdiction from an operating cost
perspective, it is unclear if this is the worst for mission interruption without measuring the
sum of MDI scores for the remaining facilities. Moreover, we need to compare this situation
to all possible cases involving two edge interdictions.
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Figure 5.6. Worst-Case Double Edge Interdiction. The combined interdiction
of edges (n02, n07) and (n09, n13) is the worst-case failure of two pipes
based on (Alderson et al. 2015) as shown in the Diesel Fuel Marine network
model, Panel A. This disruption isolates five facility functions from the flow
network (green nodes) in Panel A which translates to interruptions in facility
function in Panel B. This network disruption results in functional relocation,
replacement and interruption.
We repeat our experiment by considering all possible scenarios involving two simultaneous
pipe breaks. Figure 5.7 considers all possible cases with two pipe breaks and compares the
cost to operate the mission network versus the MDI of facility functions. Again, the green
marker represents the system prior to interdiction. We also identify the point corresponding
to the worst-case interdiction from Figure 5.6. Unlike the results for a single edge interdic-
tion, where the worst-case interdiction raised the overall MDI scores in the mission network,
here the worst-case interdiction causes the greatest increase in mission operational cost and
decrease in MDI.
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Figure 5.7. Comparison of Flow Cost vs. MDI for Double Edge Interdiction.
Each point in this figure represents a network flow solution and MDI scores
for facility functions in the DFM mission. The green point in the bottom
right is for the DFM mission without interdictions and the red points are for
all double edge interdictions. Additionally, we add a red arrow showing the
point associated with Figure 5.6
Figure 5.7 shows that when there are two simultaneous pipe breaks in the DFM system, we
find many situations where the MDI score for the network increases. Most of the scenarios
that lead to higher MDI scores are due to breaks that do not disconnect facility functions
from the larger network. In contrast, edge interdictions that disconnect facility functions lead
to situations with increased replacement and relocation costs alongside facility interruption.
In many cases, facility interruptions have a lower relocation and replaceability cost than
cases without interruptions. Since MDI calculation is heavily weighted towards MD|, it is
worse from a mission perspective to disconnect facilities from the network rather than force
significant rerouting of fuel.
5.2.2 Mission Vulnerability via Node Interdictions
We shift focus to address how facility function interruptions (i.e., the loss of nodes) in
our DFM system changes the mission network. We begin by studying how the loss of
76
a single node can impact flow costs and MDI scores. Figure 5.8A presents an example
of a single node interdiction, along with the resulting rerouted flows. Figure 5.8B shows
the corresponding changes to the mission network. Because node interruption will always
remove at least one facility function from the mission network, one might assume the
summedMDI scores always decrease. However, this is not the case. As shown in Figure 5.8,
removal of a facility function with low MDI score can lead enough redistribution of MD1
values that the total score for the network increases.
Figure 5.8. Example Single Node Interdiction. Panel A: the loss of node n01
requires re-routing of flow and a change in flow cost. Panel B: The resulting
mission network receives higher a summed MDI score.
We consider all possible cases involving the loss of a single node to assess the possible
increase or decrease in MDI versus flow cost. Figure 5.9 shows the results for each resulting
case, where the scenario from Figure 5.9 is explicitly labelled. We find situations where a
facility interruption leads to increased MDI scores are rare, as this is the only scenario that
causes this effect.
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Figure 5.9. Comparison of Flow Cost vs. MDI for Single Node Interdiction.
Each point in this figure represents a network flow solution and MDI scores
for facility functions in the DFM mission. The green point in the bottom
right is for the DFM mission without interdictions and the red points are for
all single node interdictions. Lastly, we add a red arrow showing the point
associated with Figure 5.8.
Figure 5.10 shows the worst-case interdiction of two nodes (source facility functions n08
and n10) which results in the greatest impact on mission and flow cost. With the loss of
two nodes, it is possible to completely disrupt the mission by removing both source facility
functions. From an mission assurance perspective, these source facility functions should
receive much higher MDI scores and/or prioritization based on this result. Notably, this
interdiction of the source facility function produces the highest flow cost, but it does not
produce the lowest MDI.
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Figure 5.10. Example Two Consecutive Node Interdictions. In this specific
scenario, source nodes n08 and n10 are selected for interdiction in Panel A.
This action translates over to Panel B where every node is interrupted due
to either direct interdiction or lack of fuel required to function. This dual
attack maximizes the cost in Panel A and reduces MDI scores to zero for
every node in Panel B.
Wealso all possible cases involving two node interdictions. Figure 5.11 presents the summed
MDI value versus flow cost. The worst-case loss from Figure 5.10 is explicitly labelled. We
also see a correlation between increase in cost and decrease in total MDI score. This implies
that loss of other facility functions when combined with an interdiction of a source facility
function have roughly the same impact of overall mission.
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Figure 5.11. Comparison of Flow Cost vs. MDI for Two Consecutive Node
Interdictions. Each point in this figure represents a network flow solution and
MDI scores for facility functions in the DFM mission. The green point in the
bottom right is for the DFM mission without interdictions and the red points
are for all double node interdictions. A red arrow points to the worst-case
interdiction where both source facility functions n08 and n10 are disrupted
as discussed in Figure 5.10 .
5.2.3 Implications for MDI
Overall, our analysis of mission vulnerability based on network function provides useful
insights for understanding and improving MDI. First, while MDI tries to gauge network
redundancy through SME elicitation on relocatability and replaceability, in practice this
effort is subjective and unable tomeasure these factors quantitatively. Evaluating redundancy
through the network model using flow cost and an objective function provides quantitative
measures that can lend itself to trend analysis. Furthermore, the mission network flowmodel
can capture the effects of interdictingmultiple edges and nodes, whereasMDI survey focuses
entirely on individual arcs and facility functions.
We find that MDI scores for a mission network can both increase and decrease after
interdiction. Disruption of edges and nodes lead to functional relocation and replacement
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that may increase the MDI scores of remaining nodes. This can lead to facilities receiving
higher MDI scores than when the system experiences no interdictions. This reuslt means
that the maximum (or minimum) possible MDI score for a facility is unknown given
initial network conditions. We can only find this via vulnerability analysis with network
disruptions andflow redistribution. This result strengthens our argument that including edges
representing possible flows in mission networks provides a useful basis for understanding
the mission dependency of a single facility. If further emphasizes the need for vulnerability
analysis to understand the importance of relocation and replacement of facility function.
Managing flow redistribution after an interdiction also suggests newways to protectmissions
from facility interruptions. In general, source facility functions are vulnerable nodes that
need to be protected. However, loss of distribution and demand functions can have a large
impact on overall mission depending on their location within the network. In both cases,
some facility functions and interdependencies appear to be more important than others for
mission assurance. Hardening these edges and nodes in the network can protect missions.
This is a similar result to that of Alderson et al. (2015) for optimal defense given network
interdiction. However, the objective in this work would be to minimize both the impact on
flow cost and mission, which highlights the need to defend facility functions as much as the
interdependencies between them.
Our model also emphasizes protection measures that alter the mission network itself. In
some situations, investment in an entirely new facility (e.g., adding a new node to the
network) could provide redundancy in the system that is more advantageous to flow cost
and mission than fortifying existing nodes facilities. This result also emphasizes the results
of Alderson et al. (2015) for rerouting flows, but with the addition of facility functions in
addition to flow paths.
MDI scores should also reflect the importance of facility functions on the network function.
MDI calculation is heavily weighted towards MD|, which allows many facility functions to
have highMDI scores even if they have no impact on network function. In contrast, facilities
with low MD| may have a large impact on network function if disrupted, such as source
facility functions n08 and n10. We would expect in future advances in MDI that their scores
would be the largest overall and/or their scores to be much larger than some other facilities
in the same mission.
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One way to address this issue is to weight MD| based on the facility’s impact on mission
after disruption. this would heavily weight source facility functions to receive high MDI
scores even though they have few direct connections. This would also weight distribution
and demand functions relative to each other based on their impacts on mission.
Another way to address this may be to increase the importance of MD1 to final MDI score
and to relate the MDI score of a facility to all of its interdependent facility functions. Our
model mimicsMDI calculation by only attributingMD1 from the out-degree of the the node
itself. However, in the DFM, source facility functions are providing fuel to all other nodes,
making these distribution and demand facility functions interdependent on their source.
Here, it may make sense to use a blanket assignment procedure to emphasize the fact that
the entire network is disrupted if the source is lost.
5.3 Mission Vulnerability based on MDI Scoring
We also investigate how different synthetic MDI scores affect mission vulnerability based
on facility function attacks. As described in Chapter 3, there are multiple competing ways
that a SME can answer MDI survey questions for the same DFM mission. This means
that no single set of MDI responses we create for our mission model (even if set by a real
installation SME) will inform all relevant operational perspectives. Moreover, our DFM
mission model does not consider other missions at the installation or military priorities. We
explore this in more detail.
5.3.1 Simulating MDI Scoring
We consider an experiment in which we generate many synthetic MDI scores for our DFM
mission model and assess the MDI scores of the mission. Specifically, we repeat the survey
of MDI Survey Questions for the DFM mission network as in Table 5.1, but we select
responses at random (uniformly from the possible choices) for each node. That is, all
four responses to Survey Questions 1-4 have a 0.25 likelihood of being chosen. For each
simulated survey response, we then calculate the associated MDI score for each node.
Figure 5.12 show the frequency with which each node in the DFMmission network receives
the highest MDI score. Nodes with higher connectivity tend to have higher MDI scores, but
any single node can receive the highest score in this subjective process.
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Figure 5.12. Likelihood each Facility Function Receives the Highest MDI
Score. While MDI scores are assigned using uniform distributions, some nodes
are still more likely to receive the highest scores. Specifically nodes with a
larger number of edges and a high out-degree and high MD1 get higher
scores on average. This occurs even though MD| accounts for 84% of the
MDI score.
5.3.2 Calculating MDI Impacts on Mission Vulnerability
Consider a situation where an adversary has access to the MDI values of all nodes and uses
it as a basis for selecting nodes to target in an attack. We assume the adversary will interdict
facility functions based on MDI values, interdicting the node with the highest MDI value.
In the event that two or more facilities share the highest MDI value, we assume the attacker
will choose one facility function from that group.
If we consider this hypothetical attack process for each simulated MDI survey assessment
from in Figure 5.12, then MDI scores will now vary facility to facility for every trial. To






-<0G represents the starting average MDI score prior to any attack, steady state. Any node
who is attacked or does not receive enough commodity such that the commodity at the node
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is less than zero, will have a MDI score is zero as it is not contributing to any mission.
Hence, -<8= represents the system when completely compromised, and thus will be zero.





Number of nodes available prior to attack
(5.2)
Equation 5.2 evaluates the average MDI of all nodes divided by the number of nodes prior
to any attack and will be called the static average. We use this measures to determine
the vulnerability of a mission network when high MDI facility functions are targeted.
Collectively, this allows us to assess the vulnerability of the DFM mission to attacks based
on network and facility function.
5.3.3 Analysis of MDI Scores on Mission Vulnerability
We now investigate how different synthetic MDI scores affect mission vulnerability. We use
our Monte Carlo simulation methods described in Section 5.3.1 to generate 40,000 sets of
MDI scores for the DFM mission network. Given each set of MDI scores, we recalculate
the impacts on normalized network MDI.
We then simulate the impact of an attack on the highest MDI score. We then adjust the flow
in the underlying DFM network and recalculate MDI scores.
We consider the case where the attacker can choose 1, 2, or 3 targets. In the case of more
than one target, we assume the attacker has access to the adjusted MDI scores after each
attack. Our goal is to investigate the relationship between MDI scores and network function
on expected MDI for all facilities.
Figure 5.13 presents histograms for the percent change in normalized MDI using Equa-
tion 5.2 for three consecutive interdictions interdiction budget = 1, 2, and 3 for all 40,000
simulated sets of scores. Results show bimodality of the distribution of how much aver-
age MDI scores will drop after the first interdiction, centered around MDI = 68% and
MDI = 90%. This bimodality holds for the second interdiction, but the higher peak is
reduced to MDI = 80%. A small percent of simulations with two interdictions have no
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average MDI score. These simulations are when source nodes n08 and n10 are removed
from the network. After three interdictions we see the bimodality disappear, the tail of the
distribution stretching the entire range of scores between 0 and 80%, and a significant peak
of simulations with MDI = 0.
Figure 5.13. Histogram of Normalized MDI Static Average for Three Interdic-
tions. We show the change of average MDI as the DFM network experiences
interdiction of the highest MDI node. After the first interdiction, the average
MDI score is bimodal with peaks at MDI = 90% and 68% of its original score,
meaning the network MDI dropped by 10% and 32%, respectively. After the
second interdiction, the average MDI remains bimodal centered with peaks
at 82% and 65%, with some scenarios at 0%. At the third interdiction we
see a more normal type distribution centered around 62%.
Results show that the choice of MDI values across simulations are less important than
network function and structure when determining the impact of node interdiction. If choice
of MDI answers had a strong effect on mission vulnerability, we would expect the uniform
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sample distributions for Survey Questions 1-4 would produce uniform distribution for
change in MDI after interdiction. Instead, we find clear peaks and lower variance for each
distribution in Figure 5.13, indicating that the structure and function of the network is a
strong indicator of resultingMDI score after attack.We determine that there are three factors
involved: 1) source nodes, 2) level of interdependency, 3) difference in value between the
highest MDI score and the average MDI score for a single simulation.
The existence of source facility functions impact final distributions and average scores.
Figure 5.13 shows that the second interdiction results in the entire mission interrupted. The
function source nodes serve to the mission skews their impact on overall MDI. For example,
after the third interdiction, 5.6% of the scenarios are completely interrupted. If these nodes
were randomly selected we would expect that scenario to occur 2.5% of the time.
When randomizing the values, we find intradependency has a lower impact on vulnerability
than interdependency and node degree. Figure 5.12 are three histograms showing which
nodes were chosen for interdiction based on highest MDI score. In all three cases the source
nodes, n08 and n10 were in the top three positions. Given random assignment of MDI,
MD| scores cannot explain this. On average, all nodes receive the same MD| values, so
this cannot explain this phenomena. Instead, this is because they are the only two nodes
with three edges are n08 and n10, such that they can have higher MD1 and # values than
other facility functions.
In contrast, in scenarios where specific facilities receive very high MDI scores, they ob-
fuscate the vulnerability to loss of source functions. In general, large loss in average MDI
occurs when source functions or nodes near source functions are interdicted. However, in
situations where enough facilities far from source nodes (near the corners of the network)
receive high MDI scores, the mission from protected from nodal interdiction. As a result,
protecting the network from direct attacks that interdict source facility functions is possible
by separating them from other critical functions. In other words, co-locating mission essen-
tial functions (that would normally receive high MDI scores) and source functions (that are




MDI is a key performance index used across DoD services and the federal government
for guiding infrastructure operations and planning decisions. MDI is widely adopted and
its use is generally presented as a straightforward process to calculate and categorize
mission-essential infrastructure by considering IRR factors, answering survey questions,
and inputting results into simple equations. This ranking is meant to assist decision makers
prioritize nearly $20 B of annual government funds. However, several criticisms of its
efficacy exist in the literature that suggest it has technical and practical issues in application.
Still, these criticisms have never developed a mathematical basis for their critique or provide
examples that demonstrate flaws in MDI.
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the flaws inherent in MDI with technical rigor
and identify ways to improve MDI calculation for infrastructure decisions. We do this by
developing amathematical formalism that captures howMDI currently works, identify flaws
in this process, present a model that overcomes these flaws, and studying the vulnerability
of missions using our model.
6.1 Summary
We develop a mathematical formalism for assessing the MDI of an installation based on
multilayer networks. We provide more effective definitions of key terms for MDI calcula-
tion, including mission, facility, function, dependency, intradependency, interdependency,
and installation. We use these definitions to relate their meaning and purpose to existing
multilayer network models based on node-colored network or interdependent networks-of-
networks. Our formal definition and model provide a basis for identifying the flaws in MDI
and developing simple examples demonstrating the flaws.
We identify flaws in MDI interpretation and calculation. Issues with interpretation and
use stem from conflicting perspectives on long-term infrastructure funding decisions with
perspectives on near-term consequences of infrastructure failure. The result is somemission
essential facilities, like a water distribution pump station, can receive significantly lower
87
scores than other facilities that might be less critical to mission, like a gymnasium. Issues
with interpretation and use can be overcome if the SMEs who conduct surveys for these
assessments and decision-makers agree on how MDI should be used to guide decisions.
We also identify three mathematical issues with MDI that lead to erroneous results even
if consensus is decided among SMEs and decision-makers. We refer to these issues as the
mission partitioning problem, the interdependency assignment problem, and replaceability
problem.
The mission partitioning problem relates to the way facilities are sub-divided or partitioned
into missions. Here, the size of each mission partition artificially lowers or raises MDI
scores for facilities. The key reason this problem exists is because dependencies among
facilities within a single mission are ignored in MDI calculation. To address this issue, we
recommend acknowledging and evaluating interdependency at the intra-mission level and
argue this will extinguish the partition problem altogether.
The interdependency assignment problem is the result of the way both blanket assignment
and direct assignment of missions are being using within the DoD. We show that blanket
assignment leads to higher overall MDI scores, but in doing so actual dependencies among
facilities are lost. This also occurs when multiple missions are within the same building
and dependencies are blanket assigned to the facilities rather than the missions themselves.
In both cases, blanket assignment seems to contradict the fundamental goal of MDI and
leads to issues when answering Survey Questions 1-4. For this reason, we recommend using
direct assignment when calculating MDI. Direct assignment shows actual dependency and
avoids artificially raising scores for related facilities and missions. However, this approach
only works given our solution the mission partitioning problem— direct assignment works
best when facility interactions are considered within missions. Therefore, one cannot solve
the interdependency assignment problem and the mission partitioning problem separately.
Solutions to one affect the other.
However, the final problemwe identify— the replaceability problem—suggests that neither
of these solutions will be sufficient. Even with all dependencies accounted for and direct
assignment, MDI fails to capture the dynamics of replaceability as network redundancy or
the effect of changes in O-mission facility functions and needs. Simply put, MDI is a static
network measure that is trying to assess dynamic network properties (e.g., reconfiguration,
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flows, etc.). Instead, possible, but unrealized network replacements should be modeled and
considered inMDI calculation. This is especially important given disruptions to the network
and the need to replace facility functions.
One way to consider dynamics is to treat the networks generated during MDI calculation as
flow networks. Flow networks are one way to consider dynamics, where the dependencies
among facilities would be measured as the flow over arcs. This can determined by an
optimization model or network flow algorithm depending on the installation or mission.
Whereas structural networks only measure facility-facility connectivity, flow networks also
enable the measurement of mission functional state. For example, given disruptions to a
flow network representing facilities and missions, an analyst can measure the difficulty for
replacing a facility function via the cost to meet new flow demands. Moreover, the possible
flows over the mission network can be represented explicitly in the model, yet need not
influence MDI calculation when not in use.
We develop a mission network flow model to understand how this new perspective relates
MDI andmission vulnerability.We find that including redundancies inMDI calculations can
reduce facility function scores. When redundancies are not employed facilities may appear
extremely vital to a mission even though they are easily routed around. Additionally, MDI
scores should also reflect the importance of the facility function to the network function.MDI
calculation is heavily weighted towards MD|, which allows many facility functions to have
high MDI scores even if they have no impact on network function.
As a form of sensitivity analysis, we also assess the effect of assigning synthetic MDI scores
on mission vulnerability. We find that when MDI values are randomized, MD| scores
become less important. Instead, MD1 and # , now take the spotlight. Finally, we saw that
having maximum MDI values either very close or very far away from the average MDI
score obfuscated attacks on the source nodes.
In summary, MDI is not a straightforward process that can objectively or accurately deter-
mine facility importance based on consequences to mission performance, and thus use of
MDI to support funding decisions is not justified. We find that the process is still based on
advocacy rather than data-driven analysis.
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6.2 Limitations and Future Work
There are several limitations of our current work. While our analysis provides a new view of
MDI and a model that can overcome some of its flaws, we have yet to determine a better way
to measureMDI scores themselves. Moreover, our mission network flowmodel is simplified
and possibly unrealistic. The results of our model are only helpful in real systems if flow cost
relates to actual cost in dollars. However, our measures ofMDI follow the current evaluation
process, so our interpretation of interruptability may be accurate to similar missions.
Another limitation with this work is the focus on network flowmodels. There are other ways
to study dynamics and overcomeMDI flaws. For example, simulation models could evaluate
MDI to include discrete events that determine how facility relocation and replacement
occurs. This type of model could also bridge MDI critiques to provide a better method for
determine relative importance of facilities. Additionally, our example focuses on a DFM
mission that lends itself nicely to flow networks. Other model types may provide deeper
insight into missions that are not physically linked by wire, pipes, etc.
A key issue with our analysis is we only study a single mission layer, when MDI is meant
to prioritize decisions across many missions at the same installation. Before considering
the efficacy of using network flow models, we should assess multilayer network flows to
recognize how to make sense of MDI scores across mission layers. We identify several
studies in Chapter 2 that consider multilayer and interdependent networks that provide a
basis for this analysis. Future work should implement MDI in one of these models and
analyze the effect of multilayer interdependencies on MDI scores.
Although our analysis provides understanding in IRR in the DFMmission, we only generate
MDI scores synthetically for a single mission type. Our synthetic MDI scores may not
represent how real SMEs would rank the importance of facilities. Moreover, not all missions
at military installations have similar flows and function to the DFM mission. Future work
should consider a broader set of mission types with real data from SME elicitation to
validate our conclusions.
Finally, our network flow study of MDI currently doesn’t consider related measures like FCI
and/or the final decision-making context in which MDI is used. While we provide technical
rigor to MDI calculation and analysis, final conclusions on which model to use should be
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done with respect to their impact on real decisions in this broader context.
Based on the limitations addressed, future studies should include a direct case study. This
study could continue to build on our establish model formalisms to include multilayers and
other related measures. Lastly, our model used cost as a proxy for MDI scores. MDI is about
consequence. To build a better model, rather than evaluate the output of MDI scores we
would suggest a model that could determine a different measure of effectiveness, like time
duration a facility function or mission is interrupted.
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APPENDIX: Mathematical Formulation for Min-Cost
Network Flow Problem
This minimum-cost network flow model is reproduced from Alderson et al. (2015) for
convenience.
Indices and Sets
# the set of nodes 8 ∈ # , 9 ∈ #
 undirected edge between nodes [8, 9] ∈  ⊆ # × #, 8 < 9
 directed arc (8, 9) ∈  ⊆ # × #
Parameters [units]
D8 9 the flow capacity on arc (8, 9) ∈ 
28 9 the cost per unit flow of commodity on arc (8, 9) ∈ 
Ĝ8 9 1 if [8, 9] ∈  is damaged, 0 otherwise
@8 9 penalty cost to traverse are [8, 9] ∈ 
3= supply at node = ∈ #
(-demand for 3= < 0)
?= per unit penalty for demand shortfall = ∈ #
Decision Variables [units]
.8 9 the flow on arc (8, 9) ∈ 


























.8= − (= ≤ 3= ∀= ∈ # (A.2)
0 ≤ .8 9 + . 98 ≤ D8 9 ≥ 0 ∀[8, 9] ∈  (A.3)
(= ≥ 0 ∀= ∈ # (A.4)
Our development of a mission network starts by constructing a network model of facility
function nodes # connected by undirected edges  representing possible interdependencies.
Each edge represents a physical connection between facility functions (e.g., pipe) with a
capacity D8 9 to flow a commodity (e.g., fuel) and cost to flow the commodity 28 9 . Some
nodes are source facility functions (e.g., fuel tanks) with 3= > 0 that provide commodities
to facility functions that demand fuel with 3= < 0.
All facility function nodes are able to reroute and deliver fuel from source facilities to
other facilities, similar to pumping stations and control facilities in a pipeline. As a result,
each facility function node can be interdependent on each adjacent facility depending on
commodity flow direction. Given sources, demands, and possible flow paths over edges,
solving the network flow problem with objective function (Constraint A.1) minimizes the
cost to move commodities from sources to demands and determines flow direction. The
resultingminimumcost solution determines the directionality of network interdependencies.
This network flow problem also includes parameters and constraints to minimize penalty
costs and shortfalls when serving demands. These are necessary to capture DFM mission
flows when the system is disrupted. Following realistic contracts and mission operations,
there is a penalty cost ?= for any unserved demand at a facility function. Moreover, there
is a penalty cost @8 9 applied to interdependencies that are disrupted or difficult to use.
Minimizing these penalties requires the mission to reroute commodity flows over possibly
more difficult paths. While this is may be costly to the mission network operator, it is less
costly than having a mission disruption due to loss of facility functions.
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